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ABSTRACT  
There have been many examples and cases where countries have used the provisions 
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in an advantageous yet unfair manner. As a result, 
there is a conflict emerging out of the fact that these states have an obligation to 
comply with the core principles of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), especially the 
principle of non-discrimination and free trade in the global community, while employing 
anti-dumping measures or engaging in protectionism. The WTO encourages as one 
of its main objectives free trade, which encourages member states to lower trade 
‘guards’ or trade barriers in an attempt to facilitate trade between countries. The 
advantage of this is to promote competition between member states.  
 
The legal document under scrutiny is the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA), which is a 
WTO agreement that was established to ‘focus on how governments can or cannot 
react to dumping’ in their countries. The Agreement permits government(s) to act 
against such activities where there is genuine and actual injury to the domestic 
industry.  
  
If not strictly applied within parameters, the ADA procedures can become effective 
barriers to trade, which would bring it in conflict with the core principle of free trade, 
which advocates (as briefly mentioned above) that countries should practice trade in 
a way that is free of barriers. It has been said that an economy ‘promoting free trade 
enhances competition within industries which in turn yields greater efficiency and 
better products particularly in domestic companies’ (Krueger 1990, p 68). Countries 
that are member states of the WTO have a mandatory obligation to comply with the 
principles of the WTO, which include promoting free trade and refraining from imposing 
unnecessary barriers to trade.  
 
One of the main users of barriers to trade in the form of anti-dumping duties and other 
protectionist tools is South Africa, which has become a prolific user of anti-dumping 
duties in recent years. This research thus attempts to rekindle WTO obligations within 
South Africa, while also being cognisant of the fact that protectionist policies can still 
be used, albeit in a justified manner.  
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CHAPTER 1:  
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH  
1.1 BACKGROUND TO AND OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM  
To date, disputes with South Africa over the Anti-Dumping Agreement have presented 
themselves where the prevalent issue mainly concerns the imposition of anti-dumping 
duties on other importing countries. Anti-dumping by definition refers to ‘charging extra 
import duty on the particular product from the particular exporting country in order to 
bring its price closer to the ‘normal value’ or to remove the injury to domestic industry 
in the importing country’.1 
 
One example includes a complaint by Turkey in 2003 in that South Africa was accused 
of imposing anti-dumping duties without proper notification by the then Board of Tariffs 
and Trade.2 The Board found that the establishment of the facts that lead to the anti-
dumping duties being employed were improper and the Board’s evaluation was not 
‘unbiased and objective’.3 In light of this, Turkey then claimed that South Africa had in 
fact contravened Articles 5.5, 6.1, 6.1.3, 6.2, 6.9, 6.10, 9.2, 9.3 and Article 12.1 of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement; and Articles III and X of the GATT 1994.4 To the knowledge 
of the WTO, there has since been no dispute panel, no withdrawal and no mutually 
agreed solution has been agreed on.5 A further example involving South Africa in this 
context is a complaint by Brazil in 2012 where it was alleged that the ‘preliminary 
determination and the imposition of provisional anti-dumping duties by South Africa’ 
on frozen chicken imports from Brazil, as well as the conduct and initiation of the 
investigation by ITAC was inconsistent with the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement (hereafter referred to as the ADA).6   
 
																																																						
1 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm (Accessed 11 May 2017). 
2 Now known as the International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC). 
3 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds288_e.htm (Accessed 11 March 2017). 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds439_e.htm (Accessed 11 Match 2017). 
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A more recent event involved Pakistan requesting consultations with South Africa 
regarding the imposition of anti-dumping duties on Portland cement imports.7 Pakistan 
claimed that South Africa had contravened the Anti-Dumping Agreement8 as well as 
Article VI of the GATT.9 To date, the dispute has not reached a mutually agreed 
solution.10  
 
Given the aforementioned examples demonstrating the challenge of dumping and 
antidumping measures, the situation has generated world-wide attention, with 
countries introducing anti-dumping measures to curb dumping activities within its 
respective territories. Assuming that these countries are in fact member states of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), there is a conflict emerging out of the fact that these 
states have an obligation to comply with the core principles of the WTO, especially the 
principle of non-discrimination and free trade in the global community, while employing 
these antidumping measures or engaging in protectionism. The WTO encourages as 
one of its main objectives, free trade, which encourages member states to lower trade 
‘guards’ or trade barriers in an attempt to facilitate trade between countries. The 
advantage of this is to promote competition between member states. In doing so, 
discrimination between trading partners are prohibited which leads one to the principle 
of Most-Favoured Nation (MFN). This principle, as a sort of paternalistic approach, 
states that if one country allows free trade with another, that country must extend that 
same benefit to all other WTO members.11  
 
In light of this, an exception to the MFN principle is that countries can impose barriers 
on other importing countries where unfair practices are proved to have occurred.12 
This principle thus allows for discrimination in terms of trade barriers, which then 
conflicts with the notion of free trade.  
 
																																																						
7 Ibid. 
8 Articles 1, 2.4, 2.6, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 6.1.3, 6.2, 6.4, 6.5, 6.8, 7.1, 12.1.1(i), 12.2., 18 and 
paragraph 6 of Annex II of the Anti‑Dumping Agreement. 
9 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds500_e.htm (Accessed 11 March 2017). 
10 Ibid. 
11 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (Accessed 11 March 2017). 
12 Ibid. 
3	
	
The legal documents under scrutiny are the Antidumping agreement (formally known 
as the ‘Agreement of the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994’), which is a WTO agreement that was established to ‘focus on 
how governments can or cannot react to dumping’13 in their countries. The Agreement 
permits government(s) to act against such activities where there is genuine and actual 
injury to the domestic industry. With the GATT being the predecessor of the WTO, 
Article VI has been incorporated into the Agreement establishing the WTO (hereafter 
the WTO agreement) as part of the ‘single package’ and as such it ‘allows countries 
to impose an anti-dumping duty on the exporting country to neutralise the lower price 
in an attempt to bring the price closest to what it actually is’.14 To impose this duty, 
however, a country would have to prove that dumping has indeed taken place. The 
ADA thus provides ‘detailed procedures on how dumping cases are initiated, how the 
investigations are to be conducted and that all interested parties are given opportunity 
to present evidence’.15  
  
If not strictly applied within parameters, the ADA procedures can become effective 
barriers to trade, which would bring it in conflict with the core principle of free trade, 
which advocates (as briefly mentioned above) that countries should practise trade in 
a way that is free of barriers. It has been said that an economy ‘promoting free trade 
enhances competition within industries which in turn yields greater efficiency and 
better products particularly in domestic companies’.16 Countries that are member 
states of the WTO have a mandatory obligation to comply with the principles of the 
WTO, which includes promoting free trade and imposing barriers to trade.  
 
The converse side of free trade comes in the form of protectionism. Protectionist 
measures take the form of tariff or non-tariff barriers, as a reaction to any kind of 
unwanted trade activity being conducted in a country. Due to the increase in unfair 
activities such as dumping, countries had to impose their own anti-dumping 
mechanisms to protect their domestic industry against injury from exporters. These 
																																																						
13 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm (Accessed 28 February 2017). 
14 Ibid. 
15Ibid. 
16 Krueger A Free Trade is the Best Policy In Robert Lawrence and Charles Schultz An American 
Trade Strategy: Options for the 1990s, Washington DC: Brookings Institution (1990) p 68. 
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come in the form of, for example, anti-dumping penalties and higher tariffs. According 
to Sibanda: 
 
‘[a]nti-dumping duties (and countervailing duties) constitute one of the 
exceptions to trade liberalisation and predictability goals in that members are 
allowed to impose duties to offset the anticompetitive effects of open trading in 
order to protect national industries’.17 
 
A study conducted weighing free trade against protectionist legislation in the United 
States led the author Hurabiell to state that ‘in order to be a part of freer global trade, 
the United States must also practice less protectionism’.18 
 
The same can be said for South Africa (which has implemented the required 
processes by means of the International Trade Administration Commission).19 
However, cognisance should be given to the fact that South Africa is a BRICS country, 
with its status furthermore being a developing country. By virtue of such a status as 
well as being subservient to the special and differential treatment provisions of the 
WTO, South Africa has been seen to be using the Anti-dumping agreement ‘to prevent 
competition from international economic rivals by hindering their access to the South 
African market’.20  
 
Thus, this research will attempt to uncover the balancing act of applying protectionist 
measures, those that generate millions in revenue for South Africa as well as 
protecting its domestic industry, and furthermore identifying that although ‘dumped’ 
products are sold at low prices, this is unfortunately what is the most affordable for 
																																																						
17 Sibanda O ‘Are anti-dumping measures in multilateral trade justifiable or not? A call for an 
academic debate in Africa’ Codicillus , Vol 44 , Issue 2 (2003) at p 87. 
18 Hurabiell, ML ‘Protectionism versus Free Trade: Implementing the GATT Antidumping Agreement 
in the United States’ University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol 16, Issue 3 (1995) p 
582. 
19 The International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002 established the International Trade Administration 
Commission (ITAC) which is responsible for anti-dumping investigations, defines dumping, or provides for  
the normal and export price and provides for the treatment of confidential information.  
20 Beltran Gomez, LH ‘Is South Africa using Trade Remedies as a Protectionist Measure – Reflections 
on a Court Case’ Con-Texto: Revista de Derecho y Economia, Vol 34 (2011) at p 70.  
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those who generate a low income in South Africa. However, in practising free trade, 
the benefits are far reaching for the economy.  
 
This research therefore seeks to uncover the balancing act between free trade and 
protectionist measures, through the lens of South Africa, and its adherence to the Anti-
dumping agreement.  
1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The rationale for the research is that the particular topic chosen is in fact a global 
debate, not just for South Africa, but for the international community. Free trade has 
been an ideal projected on all member states of the WTO but continues to be a 
struggle for developing and least developed countries as ‘there are only a relatively 
small number of these countries who have the economic capacity to take full 
advantage of the benefits of trade liberalisation’.21 Leland B Yeager and David G Tuerk 
argue that free trade is ‘a Utopian-like promise that has been eroded by the realities 
of the market place’22 and that free trade is ‘unreal’ or ‘a myth’.23 
 
Bergstein believes that free trade has a positive outcome in the global economy as 
‘success requires countries to compete effectively in international markets rather than 
simply at home’.24 The authors also25 argues that countries should strive for 
‘liberalization reciprocity where countries could turn to their geographical regions or to 
the world trading system as a whole’.26 Bergstein furthermore states that the global 
trading system is ‘superior because it maximizes the number of foreign markets 
involved and it avoids the economic distortions and political risks of discrimination 
among trading partners’.27 
 
																																																						
21 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-fletcher/free-trade-isnt-helping-w_b_837893.html (Accessed 
6 April 2017).  
22 Yeager & Tuerk ‘Realism and Free Trade Policy’ Cato Journal, Vol 3, Issue 3 (1983–1984) p 645.  
23 Ibid.  
24 Bergstein C.F ‘Globalizing Free Trade’ Foreign Affairs, Vol 75, Issue 3, (1996) pp 105–112. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid at p 106.  
27 Ibid.  
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Sibanda, quoting from the Doha Ministerial Declaration,28 states that ‘it is through the 
attainment of a freer or liberalized trade that world economies can obtain economic 
growth and development, which may not be fully realized under protectionism’. Root 
further provides that the benefit of free trade ensures equality between states in terms 
of its ‘marginal rate of transformation in production and its marginal rate of substitution 
in consumption and the international terms of trade’.29 The advantages of free trade 
have, in many cases, shown themselves both in theory and practicality, evidencing 
themselves in a way that where free trade is practised, ‘income rises and is more 
evenly distributed when countries pursue free trade‘.30 
 
Other writers such as Hurabiell disagree with the concept of free trade and argue that 
protectionist measures are necessary. Hurabiell argues (in a study conducted in the 
United States) that these measures were put in place to protect ‘US industrial 
interests’.31 Meanwhile, the US Congress (which was one of the subjects of the study) 
argued that by protecting the industrial interests of its citizens, they were in turn 
guarding the jobs of US citizens.32 It would seem that the underlying rationale for a 
protectionist measure is to protect a country’s domestic industry, as noted by some 
authors.33 Root also provides insight into the need for protectionist policies, providing 
arguments such as national security, infant industry, and diversification.34 
 
Upon the reading of the above authors, it is submiited that trade liberalisation is a tool 
that could lead to the acceleration of economic growth in developing countries. Since 
economic growth is the ultimate goal of such countries, the negotiation of free trade 
agreements and economic partnership agreements can strengthen the trade relations 
																																																						
28 Sibanda at p 87.  
29 Root F.R International Trade and Investment, 7th edition, The Wharton School University of 
Pennsylvania, South-Western Publishing Co (2000). 
30 Yuduo L, Ma J ‘Free Trade or Protection: A Literature Review on Trade Barriers’ Research in World 
Economy, Volume 2, (2011) p 72. 
31 Hurrabiel at p 582.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Schick JR ‘Agreement on Safeguards: Realistic Tools for Protecting Domestic Industry or 
Protectionist Measures’ Suffolk Transnational Law Review, Volume 27, Issue 1 (2003–2004) p 157. 
See also the Agreement on Safeguards. 
34 Yuduo at p 72.  
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with developing countries and developed countries. This echoes the views of 
Bergstein and Sibanda quoted above.  
 
However, developing countries do inhibit the need for revenue, and one of the main 
sources of revenue is generated by tariffs or by other means of protectionist policies. 
Similarly, developing countries cannot resort to protectionist policies as the main 
source of revenue as the engagement of trade is an equally important component in 
the growth of the economy. Moreover, imposing trade barriers against developed 
countries, for example, could lead to the breakdown of relations between the two, and 
furthermore, developing countries may need assistance from the latter in terms of 
special and differential treatment provisions in respect of certain WTO agreements 
which may not be reciprocated by developed countries, as these provisions are not 
mandatory. That is not to say that protectionist policies should be abolished entirely. 
It is submitted that they should be utilised when circumstances call for it, such as when 
dumping is proved to have taken place, but excessive use of such policies may isolate 
developing countries with regard to trade.  
 
Henry George, author of ‘Protection or Free Trade: An Examination of the Tariff 
Question, with Especial Regard to the Interests of Labor’ provided his views on the 
topic as far back as 1949 and afforded mention to American protectionists who 
contended that:  
 
‘…protection is everywhere beneficial to a nation, and free trade everywhere is 
injurious; that the prosperous nations have built up their prosperity by 
protection, and that all nations that would be prosperous must adopt that policy. 
And the arguments must be universal to have any plausibility, for it would be 
absurd to assert that a theory of national growth and prosperity applies to some 
countries but not to others’.35 
 
																																																						
35 George H Protection or Free Trade: An Examination of the Tariff Question, with Especial Regard to 
the Interests of Labor, Robert Schalkenbach Foundation (1949) p 29. 
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At present, Fouda36 also provides an argument that plays into the hands of those who 
are anti-free trade. Fouda further submits that that protection against foreign 
companies establishes a guard over infant industries in that these newly formed 
companies, especially those in developing countries, would struggle against 
international competition. Protectionist policies would thus allow these companies to 
progress and improve in this way.37 
 
Another argument is that companies are often faced with situations where their 
industry declines and inefficiency runs rampant; thus protectionist policies are used as 
a tool to ‘buy time’ in order for these industries to reinvent themselves.38 Protectionist 
measures are also often used as instruments for government revenue.39 Revenue for 
developing countries is used as a source of funding40 as opposed to developed 
countries having its primary source of revenue from taxes other than tariffs imposed 
on products of trade.41 One example is that of Japan in which it generated about one 
trillion Yen in tariff revenue, but this forms less than 2% of its total tax revenue (1996).42 
 
However, Article VI of the GATT condemns dumping only where it ‘causes or threatens 
material injury to an established industry in the territory of a contracting party or 
materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry’.43 Although the GATT uses 
the broader ‘injury to industry’ language instead of condemning only dumping that 
injures competition, the standards that must be met before a dumping duty may be 
imposed suggest that the Agreement adopts a competitive rather than a protectionist 
stance.44 
 
																																																						
36 Fouda R.A.N ‘Free Trade and Protectionism: A Country’s Glory or Doom?’ International Journal of 
Trade, Economics and Finance Vol 3, (2012).  
37 Ibid at p 351.  
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid at p 353.  
40 http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/gCT9904e.html (Accessed 6 April 2017). 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
44 Ehrenhaft, P.D ‘What the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Trade Agreements 
Act [Can] [Will] [Should] Mean for U.S. Trade Policy’, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. pp 1361–1362 
(1979). 
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According to Hurabiell,45 the US regularly imposes anti-dumping measures however 
these measures are ‘incompatible with free trade policies’. Herein lies the issue that 
this research intends in contributing to. Academics argue46 ‘that anti-dumping 
measures are in conflict with ‘the key benefits of global trade rules that are stable and 
predictable access to foreign markets’.47 Others propose that ‘anti-dumping measures 
are a significant threat to the prospect of international freer trade’.48 As a matter of 
fact, authors argue that no such justification for anti-dumping measures exists.49 
Deardoff proposes, quite arguably, that anti-dumping mechanisms may solve the 
issue of dumping on the face of it, but fails to wholly correct the activity on a global 
scale. He states that ‘in precisely this situation antidumping policies would have hardly 
any effect. The fluctuation here is on the world market and a policy to restrict the price 
of a particular foreign exporter may exclude him from the market, but it will not 
appreciably raise the price’50 set by the companies accused of such activities in the 
export country.  
 
In fact, it has been said that the use of anti-dumping duties has been increasingly used 
as a veil against protectionist policies that is counter to free trade principles contained 
in the GATT.51 The overall foundation for antidumping activity is to protect the domestic 
industry from any injury caused by the foreign market as a result of dumping within the 
territory. In short, antidumping activity can be justified in order to ‘prevent international 
predation’.52 
 
Gay notes that if antidumping activity were limited only to situations where international 
predatory pricing has occurred, it would indeed have a major impact on antidumping 
																																																						
45 Hurrabiel at p 582. 
46 Sibanda at p 87.  
47 Evenett S.J ‘The World Trading System: The Road Ahead’ Finance and Development 36(4): 22 
(1999). 
48 Corr CF ‘Trade Protection in the New Millennium: The Ascendancy of Antidumping Measures’ Nw J 
Int'l & Bus (1997) 49, 53. See also McGee `The case to repeal anti-dumping laws' Nw J Int'l & Bus 
(1993) 431. 
49 Deardoff AV ‘Economic Perspectives on Antidumping Laws’ Research Seminar on International 
Economics, University of Michigan, (1989) pp 4–7.  
50Ibid. 
51 Gay P ‘Unveiling Protectionism: Anti-Dumping, the GATT and Suggestions for Reform’ Dalhousie 
Journal of Legal Studies (1997) p 51. 
52 Ibid. 
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activity. He adds that proving the occurrence of international predation in the early 
1900s was a challenge as a result of insufficiency of information and resources, but 
proving such predatory pricing presently will be equally as difficult, not because of the 
lack of tools and information, but because ‘theoretical possibilities are sufficiently 
limited as to make such predation in cases of international dumping a practical non-
entity’.53 In light of this statement, Gay states that economists and businesspersons 
have thus condemned the antidumping provisions of the GATT for the implicit wording 
that price differentiation and below-cost pricing are not ‘within the ordinary course of 
trade’.54 
 
In respect of the theory of below-cost pricing, international practice has suggested that 
price is a component of fixed and variable costs. Fixed costs remain constant 
throughout, and thus where prices have escalated, the rational choice would be to 
decrease the market price, even where production costs ‘are not fully realised’.55 
However, in doing so, this conflicts the exporter in being subject to anti-dumping 
duties.56 
 
Regarding price differentiation, Hagelstam notes that this is a legitimate strategy that 
is commonly used by suppliers who use such a tactic in response to price elasticity. 
Elasticity is dependent on many factors such as substitution possibilities, consumer 
tastes, and purchasing powers,57 and thus is not the same in every country. Therefore, 
Hagelstam notes that to base the usage of anti-dumping measures on price elasticity, 
in light of the differences between countries, would be ‘both unfair and not 
economically merited’.58 
  
																																																						
53 Ibid at p 56–57.  
54 Article VI of the GATT 1994. 
55 Gay P ‘Unveiling Protectionism: Anti-Dumping, the GATT and Suggestions for Reform’ Dalhousie 
Journal of Legal Studies (1997) p 57. 
56 Hagelstam J ‘Some Shortcomings of Anti-Dumping Provisions’ Journal of World Trade Volume 25 
(1991) p 99. 
57 Gay P ‘Unveiling Protectionism: Anti-Dumping, the GATT and Suggestions for Reform’ Dalhousie 
Journal of Legal Studies (1997) p 58. 
58 Hagelstam at p 100.  
11	
	
1.3 PRINCIPAL THEORIES  
International trade law is littered with legal, economic and political policies and 
theories. Having said that, it is not the purpose of this thesis to provide an expansive 
discussion on each of these theories, as such a limited overview of particular theories 
such as the free trade theory (which originated from the traditional theories such as 
the ‘absolute advantage theory’ and the ‘comparative advantage theory’59 will be 
provided. As was noted somewhat earlier in the chapter, the free trade theory of 
absolute advantage refers to a country’s method of producing goods or services where 
a lower input is utilised.60 This theory also ‘compares productivity of different producers 
or economies’.61 The absolute advantage theory was established by the ‘father of free 
trade’, Adam Smith. According to Smith, different countries can have an absolute 
advantage in respect of the same product, but in different domestic markets, taking 
into consideration transport costs, which are indeed production costs.62 Where two 
countries which specialise in the production of a particular product start trading with 
each other, where each has its own turn at obtaining a comparative advantage, more 
products can be produced more efficiently in that materials used in production are 
used efficiently. Therefore, consumption of that particular product would be at a higher 
level between these two nations.63 
 
Also, as discussed earlier, another principle which will also be focused on throughout 
the thesis is the protectionist theory, which refers to ‘government actions that restrict 
or restrain international trade, often done with the intent of protecting local businesses 
and jobs from foreign competition’.64 
 
																																																						
59 Due to the expansive nature of the CAT and AAT- this thesis will not engage in an expansive 
discussion. 
60 https://www.boundless.com/economics/textbooks/boundless-economics-textbook/international-
trade-31/introduction-to-international-trade-124/absolute-advantage-versus-comparative-advantage-
493-12589/ (Accessed 16 March 2017). 
61 Ibid. 
62 Schumacher R ‘Adam Smith’s theory of absolute advantage and the use of Doxography in the 
History of Economics’ Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, Vol 5, (2012) p 54–80. 
63 Ibid at p 65.  
64 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/protectionism.asp (Accessed 6 April 2017).  
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The MFN principle will also be briefly discussed later in the context of states adopting 
anti-dumping measures as trade barriers to one country as opposed to the imposition 
of such barriers to others.65 
1.4 PURPOSE STATEMENT  
In consideration of the aforementioned, the purpose of this dissertation therefore, is to 
analyse the balance and differing views of free trade and protectionist stances with a 
focus on the Antidumping agreement and the position adopted by South Africa. In 
doing so, the following research questions (set out below) will be answered.  
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The key questions to be determined in this research will essentially take the form of 
the following: 
 
• What role do free trade and protectionist principles play in the current global trading 
system? To what extent has the formation of the WTO affected the formation of 
current anti-dumping procedures and practices? 
• What are the focal points in the Antidumping agreement, and how have these 
affected current antidumping practices? 
• To what extent has SA implemented relevant legislation to govern antidumping? 
How did South Africa arrive at the legislation governing antidumping, and what 
landmark cases were heard involving antidumping in South Africa? How does free 
trade impact on the dumping situation in South Africa, and what protectionist 
measures does South Africa have against antidumping? 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The nature of the research will be based on theoretical and academic writings based 
on the researcher’s topic. Antidumping causes heated debates and as such this 
research will also use the current literature to discuss the issues on the subject matter. 
There are a number of contributions by a host of international and national authors 
(academic and practitioners) on the subject. Thus, the research will mainly be desktop. 
																																																						
65 See above, paragraph 3.  
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As such, the sources of information to be used for this topic would typically be from 
journal articles and textbooks from experts on international trade as well as case law 
with reference to the relevant international agreements. It has been established that 
these types of source would be best suited for this type of research as this topic is not 
one that involves any type of survey or collecting data from individuals. 
1.7 CHAPTER OUTLINE  
Chapter 1: Essentially the research proposal, which includes but is not limited to 
background, research questions, research methodology and chapter outline. 
 
Chapter 2: In this chapter, the research will firstly discuss the history of GATT and the 
formation of the WTO with particular focus on how the establishment of the WTO 
affected the formation of the Antidumping agreement. Secondly, it will briefly continue 
to discuss the WTO principles that underpin multilateral trading system. 
 
Chapter 3: This chapter will analyse the provisions of the ADA and relevant cases, to 
determine how the particular Agreement has affected past and current antidumping 
practices. 
 
Chapter 4: This chapter deals with an overview of relevant SA legislation to determine 
the extent to which SA has implemented the relevant legislation to govern 
antidumping. It includes a discussion on how South Africa arrived at the legislation 
governing antidumping and what landmark cases were heard involving antidumping 
in South Africa. Lastly, the chapter will discuss whether free trade has impacted the 
dumping situation in South Africa and what protectionist measures South Africa has 
against antidumping. 
 
Chapter 5: Recommendations and conclusion on the topic.  
1.8 CONCLUSION  
The aforementioned information contained in this chapter displays an outline of what 
this thesis will contain with regard to the debate concerning the subject matter. The 
following chapters will thus attempt to add insight to this worldwide controversy in the 
14	
	
hope that the submissions put forth will shed light on the matter. The following chapter 
will discuss the origins of the international institutions that govern trade, both past and 
present, and will furthermore provide submissions on how the establishment of said 
institutions have affected dumping practices currently.  
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CHAPTER 2:  
GATT, WTO, AND THE FORMATION OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs was for many years at the forefront of 
trade relations to such an extent that any current discussion needs to provide a 
background on it. More so, as the backbone of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
and its array of multilateral agreements, a discussion of the extent to which the GATT 
and the current trade frameworks have shaped in particularly the Antidumping 
agreement is required. As such the chapter seeks to determine in particular how the 
formation of the WTO with particular focus on how the establishment of the WTO 
affected the formation of the Antidumping agreement, which is the crux of the 
research. As such the chapter will first discuss the historical overview of previous 
multilateral trade organisations such as the International Trade Organization, and 
thereafter progress in the chapter dealing with the various multilateral trade 
negotiations that inevitably led to the inception of the World Trade Organisation. 
Secondly, it will briefly continue to discuss the WTO principles that underpin 
multilateral trading system. 
2.2 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF PAST TRADE INSTITUTIONS 
2.2.1 The International Trade Organization (ITO) 
The beginning that marked the end of the Second World War had the allies pushing 
not only for world peace, but also for a system that would never again bring the 
international economy to a screeching crash.66 The Allies thus fully made use of this 
opportunity to redesign the new world,67 which encompassed the birth of the post-war 
establishment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as a 
central bank, the General Assembly of the United Nations, and the International Court 
																																																						
66 Drache D ‘The Short but Significant Life of the International Trade Organisation: Lessons to be 
Learned’ CSGR Working Paper No. 62/00 (2000) p 8. 
67 VanGrasstek C ‘The History and Future of the World Trade Organization’ WTO Publications (2013) 
p 12. 
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of Justice (ICJ), as well as other organisations representing agriculture,68 education 
and culture,69 health,70 labour,71 and others.  
 
Similarly, the International Trade Organization (ITO) was proposed to be established 
as an institution that would emulate the functions of a ‘global trade ministry’,72 with the 
original intention of creating a third institution to handle the trade sector of international 
economic cooperation, joining the other ‘Bretton Woods’73 institutions previously 
mentioned.74 The vision that was hoped for was to have these institutions mirror that 
of a world government, but naturally this was plagued by a series of tribulations, one 
that included that countries all reserved the right to their own sovereignty.75 The 
concerns over sovereignty subsequently forced drafters of the ITO to ‘pursue rather 
modest goals’.76 A draft ITO Charter evidenced an over-extension of trade disciplines, 
one that included rules on employment, commodity agreements, restrictive business 
practices, international investment, and services.77 The aim of this was to create 
inevitably an ITO at a United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment in 
Havana, Cuba in 1947. In the meantime, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(globally known as the GATT), which was also established in 1947, served as a 
provisional measure until ratification of the Havana Charter.78 
 
																																																						
68 Food and Agriculture Organization (an extension of the United Nations that leads international co-
operation to defeat hunger around the world http://www.fao.org/home/en/ (Accessed 17 June 2017). 
69 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (also known as ‘UNESCO’, this 
organisation is renowned for its efforts to bring international efforts in fight for education, science, 
culture and communication) http://en.unesco.org/about-us/introducing-unesco (Accessed 17 June 
2017). 
70 World Health Organization (an agency of the United Nations that concerns itself with international 
public health http://www.who.int/en/ (Accessed 17 June 2017). 
71 International Labour Organization (an international organization setting labour standards, develop 
policies and create programmes promoting work standards for men and women) 
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang--en/index.htm (Accessed 17 June 2017). 
72 Van Grasstek at p 11. 
73 International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
74 https://crossick.blogactiv.eu/2009/06/04/international-trade-the-rise-fall-of-the-havana-charter/ 
(Accessed 23 April 2017). 
75 VanGrasstek at p 11.  
76 Ibid. 
77 See note 74. 
78 Ibid. 
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The Conference held at Havana thus began on 21 November 1947, subsequent to the 
signing of the GATT.79 The event coordinating the Charter proved to be a success, as 
it ‘served as a prototypical model agreement for its time, complementing the IMF and 
the World Bank, as envisaged by the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944’.80 A number 
of proposals to safeguard industries and allow trade restrictions were tabled, which 
proved much to the advantage of a significant number of developing nations who were 
present at the negotiations.81 As such, a Charter was thus founded, one that 
encompassed the authority to establish the ITO.  
 
Less than a year later, once the ITO Charter was agreed upon in Havana in March 
1948, the proposed ITO would remain immortalised as nothing but an ideology, as the 
Charter was met with significant resistance, one that included the US Congress 
opposing ratification of the Charter, ironically, where it had been one of the strongest 
proponents for the ideal.82 The GATT remained thereafter as the only multilateral trade 
instrument that governed international trade from 1948, up until the year in which the 
World Trade Organisation was established.83 Drache84 submits that ‘in the end, the 
ITO fell victim to cold war politics, shifting US priorities, a protectionist Congress and 
elites that preferred not to have a strong world trade organisation with non-liberal 
principles and goals’. As such, Diebold85 argued that ‘neither the ITO nor the GATT 
said a word about free trade’. 
  
																																																						
79 Ibid. 
80 Drache at p 16. 
81 Crossick S ‘International Trade: The Rise and Fall of the Havana Charter’ 
https://crossick.blogactiv.eu/2009/06/04/international-trade-the-rise-fall-of-the-havana-charter/ 
(Accessed 23 April 2017). 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Drache at p 28. 
85 Diebold W Jr. (1994), ‘Reflections on the International Trade Organization’, Northern Illinois 
University Law Review 14(2) p 336. 
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2.2.2 The GATT and Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN)  
Since the failure of the ITO, ‘world commerce’86 had been governed by the GATT87 up 
until 1994, where the global economy saw the establishment of the WTO. During the 
period of the GATT, the rules provided in the Agreement formed the foundation of 
international trade and contributed to ‘some of the highest growth rates in international 
commerce’.88 Despite the considerable achievements of the GATT, it was nonetheless 
a provisional agreement.89 As a result, signatory states to the GATT were referred to 
as ‘contracting parties’. The GATT which was signed in 1947 as a supplemental 
agreement to the ITO originally had 23 contracting parties, those which ‘were also the 
part of the larger group negotiating the ITO Charter’.90  
 
The basic principles91 contained in the original GATT remained much as they had 
been since 1948.92 The Rounds (known as ‘trade rounds’ or ‘multilateral negotiations’) 
that followed93 focused primarily on the efforts to reduce trade barriers, with additions 
of a section on development that was introduced in the 1960s as well as the 
introduction of plurilateral agreements in the 1970s.94 Ironically, during these early 
years, even where the GATT initially served as a safety net subsequent to the fall of 
the ITO, it was remarked that the ‘biggest leaps forward in international trade 
liberalisation have come through these rounds which were held under the GATT’s 
auspices’.95 
 
																																																						
86 Blumberg L ‘GATT gives Way to WTO’ Juta’s Business Law, Vol 3, Issue 1 (1995) p 31. 
87 Prior to the GATT coming into force, the Protocol of Provisional Application (PPA) had allowed for 
the provisional application of the GATT for almost 50 years up until one year after the signing of the 
Marrakesh Agreement that established the WTO. Information taken from 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gatt_e/task_of_signing_e.htm (Accessed 27 November 2017).  
88 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (Accessed 28 April 2017). 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Because of the expansive nature of this chapter in dealing with the historical progression of the 
events that led up to the WTO, this research will refrain from discussing the principles of the GATT, as 
the principles of the WTO are discussed in detail later in this chapter.  
92 See note 87. 
93 Geneva in 1947, Annecy in 1949, Torquay in 1951, Geneva in 1956 and again at Geneva (known 
as the ‘Dillon Round’) https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (Accessed 28 
April 2017). 
94 See note 87. 
95 Ibid. 
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The multilateral negotiations that followed in the mid-1960s came in the form of the 
Kennedy Round held at Geneva. A significant round it was, where Norwood submits 
that ‘it was hailed upon its completion in Geneva, not only because of the trade 
liberalisation achieved, but because of the methods used in achieving that 
liberalisation’.96  
2.2.3 The Kennedy Round of Negotiations 
Discrimination of the United States from foreign markets gave the international giant 
a reason to prompt a further round of negotiations – The Kennedy Round.97 A 
momentous development arose during the Kennedy Round of negotiations, among 
the discussions of tariff and non-tariff barriers.98 This was known as the ‘international 
antidumping code’.99 Formally known as ‘Agreement on Implementation of Article VI 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’, (hereafter referred to as ‘Article VI’) 
the Code ‘outlines the principles under which anti-dumping may be assessed and 
furthermore acts as an elaboration to Article VI.100 
 
Symons submits that the reason for the international anti-dumping code was 
‘obvious’.101 It is trite in international law as per the broad principles provided for in the 
GATT that it is the responsibility of the authorities within a state to determine whether 
dumping has taken place. Symons provides that it is against this background that 
disputes arise as well as confusion as to the administrative process arriving at such a 
decision, and thus prove the necessity of the role of the Code.102 It is furthermore 
argued that the need for the Code was necessary because of the difficulty of amending 
																																																						
96 Norwood B ‘The Kennedy Round: A Try at Linear Trade Negotiations’ Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol 12, Issue 2 (1969) p 297. 
97 Irwin DA ‘The Truths About Trade: What Critics Get Wrong About The Global Economy’ Foreign 
Affairs Vol 95, Issue 4 (2016) p 95.  
98 Lamp N ‘The Club Approach to Multilateral Trade Lawmaking’ Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law Vol 49, Issue 1 (2016) p 137. 
99 Ibid at p 140. 
100 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947. 
101 Symons EL Jr. ‘The Kennedy Round, GATT, Anti-Dumping Code’ University of Pittsburgh Law 
Review, Vol 29, Issue 3 (1968) p 489. 
102 Ibid. 
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the GATT103 owing to the large number of contracting parties that were bound to its 
provisions.  
 
It was thus hoped that the outcome of the Kennedy Round would provide national 
authorities with a procedure that would provide assistance in the determination of any 
dumping activity, one that is ‘predictable and fairer to all interested parties’.104 
 
Although Article VI on the face of it embodies a protectionist stance, the Preamble 
affirms the principle of freer trade by the Contracting Parties while also covering tariff 
and non-tariff barriers.105 The Preamble furthermore states that in order to give effect 
to its provisions, the purposes of Article VI: 
 
‘are to provide for equitable and open procedures as the basis for a full 
examination of dumping cases’, ‘to interpret the provisions of Article VI of the 
General Agreement [on Tariffs and Trade]106 and to elaborate rules for their 
application in order to provide greater uniformity and certainty in their 
implementation’ and to acknowledge that ‘the imposition of anti-dumping duty 
is a measure to be taken only under circumstances provided for in Article VI of 
the General Agreement’.  
 
The years following the Kennedy Round saw the international community alleging that 
the GATT rules had become ‘obsolete, ignored or in need of strengthening in several 
key areas’.107 Graham suggests that these problems included rules pertaining to 
government subsidies, to temporary import restrictions under the ‘escape clause’, 
government restrictions on importing, and settlement of international trade disputes.108 
Graham further submits that additional challenges had become apparent in that the 
																																																						
103 Curzon G, Curzon V The Multi-Tier GATT System The New Economic Nationalism p 137–147 
(1980). 
104 Symons at p 490. 
105 Ibid.  
106 additional information added.  
107 Graham TR ‘Results of the Tokyo Round’ Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 
Vol 9, Issue 2 (1979) p 156. 
108 Ibid at p 157. 
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European Economic Community (EEC)109 was emerging as an international trading 
giant that had begun its gradual ascent to take on fellow international trading giant, 
the United States of America, and least-developed countries had begun to use the 
newly emergent forum, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD),110 to put forth their interests in relation to trade that were adverse to the 
basic principles of the GATT; that being the Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle.111 
2.2.4 The Tokyo Round of Negotiations  
The global trading community thus used these challenges as the catalyst to begin 
negotiations in a further round known as the Tokyo Round. The Tokyo Declaration, 
which provided the Round with its namesake, provided that ‘consideration shall be 
given to improvements in the international framework for the conduct of world trade’ 
and further recognised ‘the importance of the application of differential measures to 
developing countries in ways which will provide special and more favourable treatment 
for them in areas of the negotiation where this is feasible and appropriate’,112 a first in 
the negotiating Rounds under the GATT.113 
 
																																																						
109 The European Economic Community comprises of three separate communities, that being ‘the 
European Coal and Steel Community, established by the Treaty of Paris in 1951 to regulate 
production and liberalise Europe's trade in coal and steel products; the European Atomic Energy 
Community, formed by the Treaty of Rome in 1957; and the European Economic Community, also 
created by the Treaty of Rome’. The EEC originally consisted of ‘six Western European nations—
Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and West Germany. Britain, Ireland, and 
Denmark were admitted in 1973. Three southern European countries were allowed to join once they 
installed democratic governments—Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986’. Information taken 
from http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/EuropeanEconomicCommunity.html (Accessed 
27 November 2017).  
110 The role of UNCTAD is to ‘support developing countries to access the benefits of a globalized 
economy more fairly and effectively [and] to help equip them to deal with the potential drawbacks of 
greater economic integration. To do this, [UNCTAD] provides analysis, consensus-building, and 
technical assistance. This helps [developing countries] to use trade, investment, finance, and 
technology as vehicles for inclusive and sustainable development.’ Taken from 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/aboutus.aspx (Accessed 27 November 2017).  
111 Ibid at p 156. 
112 Declaration of Ministers Approved at Tokyo on 14 September 1973, para. 1, reprinted in 
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED 
DOCUMENTS (20th Supp.) pp 19–20. 
113 Graham at p 156.  
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The Tokyo Round began in 1973 and concluded in 1979 and served as a negotiating 
forum for 102 countries.114 In its initial negotiations, the Tokyo Round aimed to 
perpetuate the GATT’s efforts to reduce tariffs at a progressive rate.115 
 
In addition to the negotiations regarding tariff reductions, the Tokyo Round also 
centred around non-tariff barriers. In terms of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, negotiators sought to gain more clarity in respect of certain 
elements about which the GATT was unclear.116 The birth of the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (hereafter referred to as the ‘SCM 
Agreement’) thus provided much-needed clarity on these issues by providing 
adequate control over the use of subsidies and ensuring that an ‘injury standard’ is 
adhered to by all signatories.117 
 
The Tokyo Round furthermore resulted in a revision of the Anti-Dumping Code that 
was established in the Kennedy Round. Changes made to the Anti-Dumping Code 
included ‘determination of injury, price undertakings between importing and exporting 
countries and imposition and collection of anti-dumping duties’ and attempting to align 
these elements with the provisions of the SCM Agreement.118 Further notable 
outcomes of the Tokyo Round included Government procurement, the establishment 
of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (which primarily regulated the use of 
Member states using standards as unnecessary obstacles to trade), customs 
valuation, import licensing, and dispute settlement, as well as further ‘sectoral’119 
Agreements on Agriculture and Dairy,120 an Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat,121 
																																																						
114 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (Accessed 20 May 2017). 
115 Ibid. 
116 Graham at p 162. The GATT provided no reasonable definition of ‘export subsidy’ or what 
constitutes a ‘domestic subsidy’ which created confusion among the international community, seeing 
as these types of subsidies were prohibited under the GATT. Furthermore, the US’ domestic law on 
countervailing duties provided no indication that there needed to be ‘material injury to the domestic 
industry’, as the rules of the GATT required.  
117 Ibid.  
118 Graham at p 165.  
119 Ibid at p 172. 
120 The New International Dairy Agreement GATT Doc. MTN/DP/8. 
121 GATT Doc. MTN/ME/8. 
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the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft,122 and Steel.123 However, these Agreements 
and Codes were voluntary, and not all of the Contracting Parties to the GATT assented 
to them.124  
 
Further, during this round, developing countries interests became one of the focal 
points during this round and their interests as well, due to the reason being that many 
countries had just begun to see the advantages of negotiations and moreover, began 
to break free of ties with colonial powers.125 
2.2.5 The Uruguay Round of Negotiations 
Approximately three years subsequent to the conclusion of the Tokyo Round, the 
United States (US) sought to use that momentum to their advantage by proposing a 
new round of multilateral negotiations,126 in order to ‘continue where the Tokyo Round 
left off’.127 
 
In 1986, the US was successful in achieving its goal of beginning a new round of 
negotiations and urged the Contracting States to start negotiations to extend the scope 
of GATT in covering trade in services, the protection of intellectual property, trade-
related investment measures, and finally, to improve the GATT rules where such 
needed attention.128 The final round of negotiations thus began in Punta del Este, 
Uruguay, in 1986. This last round of MTN proved to be anything but expeditious in that 
this Round saw eight years before negotiations came to an end.129 
																																																						
122 GATT Doc. MTN/W/38. 
123 Although an Agreement on Steel was not formally part of the Tokyo Round, it was closely related 
to the negotiations, in which a steel committee was established to ‘encourage the continuation and 
extension of free trade in steel, and to provide a means of disseminating information and coordinating 
policies among governments with respect to trade in steel.’ See Graham at pp 165–173. 
See also https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (Accessed 21 May 2017). 
124 Bello JH, Footer ME ‘Symposium: Uruguay Round-GATT/WTO’ The International Lawyer Volume 
29, Issue 2 (1995) p 336. 
125 Page S ‘Developing Countries in GATT/WTO Negotiations’ Working Paper p 14 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.195.3749&rep=rep1&type=pdf (Accessed 
27 November 2017).  
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. 
128 US Department of State Dispatch ‘Fact Sheet: Benefits of the Uruguay Round’ Vol 5 (1994) p 16. 
129 Leebron DW ‘Overview of the Uruguay Round Results’ Columbia Journal of Transnational Law Vol 
34, Issue 1 (1996) p 11. 
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A change over in the US administration made closure of the negotiations imminent,130 
as the US and the EU had finally reached a mutually agreed solution to their 
differences on agriculture.131Thereafter, the signing of the Final agreement in 
Marrakesh on 15 April 1994132 (known as the Marrakesh Agreement) marked the end 
of one era but the birth of another – The World Trade Organisation.  
 
The Uruguay Round resulted in the expansion of the authority of the GATT to 
uncharted areas such as agreements in respect of trade in textiles, agriculture, and 
services, as well as intellectual property.133 The GATT was subsequently replaced by 
the WTO as the international organisation governing the multilateral trading system 
while still remaining as the agreement governing trade in goods.134 Further to that, the 
establishment of the WTO had led to what Kleen135 refers to as ‘collectively 
associat[ing] all countries to all new (and previous) agreements’, which is universally 
known as the ‘single undertaking’. This translates into ‘every negotiation is part of a 
whole and indivisible package and cannot be negotiated separately’.136 Thus, once a 
Member has signed the Final Agreement establishing the WTO, that Member was 
bound to every other agreement in the WTO.137 
  
																																																						
130 Bello at p 338. See also https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm 
(Accessed 21 May 2017). 
131 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm accessed 21 May 2017). This 
deal was loosely termed the ‘Blair House Accord’. 
132 Agreement Establishing the WTO (‘Marrakesh Agreement’) http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/151021multilateral.pdf (Accessed 17 June 2017). See also Bello at p 338. 
133 Crowley MA ‘An Introduction to the WTO and GATT’ Economic Perspectives (2003) p 44. 
134 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (Accessed 21 May 2017).  
135 Kleen P ‘So Alike Yet So Different: A Comparison of the Uruguay Round and the Doha Round’ Jan 
Tumlir Policy Essays (2008) p 7.  
136 Ibid, p 7 at note 13. See also https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/work_organi_e.htm 
(Accessed 22 May 2017). 
137 Article II:2 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO (‘Marrakesh Agreement’).  
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2.3 THE PRINCIPLES UNDERPINNING THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANISATION (WTO)  
The Agreements contained in the single undertaking are ‘lengthy and complex’138 as 
there are a variety of agreements dealing with different sectors.139 Thus, it was 
necessary to create a series of principles that can essentially reflect the WTO and the 
agreements it encompasses, preventing the administrative burden of compiling 
principles that are unique to each and every agreement.140 These principles are 
examined below:141 
 
a) Trade without discrimination: Non-discrimination is fundamental to the WTO and is 
further divided into two subcomponents: the Most Favoured Nation Treatment Principle 
and the National Treatment Principle.142 The former is a core notion that underlies all 
WTO Agreements, that member states may not discriminate between each other, in 
that where is a benefit is granted to one country, that concession must be extended to 
all member states of the WTO.143 The latter principle is a further essential principle that 
is central to all WTO Agreements in that foreign goods or services must not be 
discriminated against domestic products or services of a member state.144 
 
b) Freer trade: The most common and integral way of encouraging trade across the globe 
is through the lowering of trade barriers145 that provides a growing access to 
																																																						
138 ‘Understanding the WTO’ (written and published by the WTO) p 10.  
139 agriculture, textiles and clothing, banking, telecommunications, government purchases, industrial 
standards and product safety, food sanitation regulations, intellectual property, and much more. See 
note 138.   
140 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (Accessed 21 May 2017).  
141 Ibid. See also 
https://ecampus.wto.org/admin/files/Course_378/Module_1370/ModuleDocuments/M2_E.pdf 
(Accessed 22 May 2017). 
142 https://ecampus.wto.org/admin/files/Course_378/Module_1370/ModuleDocuments/M2_E.pdf 
(Accessed 22 May 2017). 
143 Ibid. See also ‘Introduction to the WTO, Principles and Agreements’ 
http://www.unitar.org/ny/sites/unitar.org.ny/files/1)%20Intro,%20Principles%20and%20Agreements%2
0May2010.pdf (Accessed 23 May 2017). 
144 Ibid. See also ‘’Matshusita M ‘Basic Principles of the WTO and the Role of Competition Policy’ 
Washington University Global Studies World Review Volume 3, Issue 2 (2004) pp 366–367. 
145 Ibid. See also ‘Introduction to the WTO, Principles and Agreements’ 
http://www.unitar.org/ny/sites/unitar.org.ny/files/1)%20Intro,%20Principles%20and%20Agreements%2
0May2010.pdf (Accessed 23 May 2017). 
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markets.146 These trade barriers take many forms, one that includes tariffs, quotas, 
and non-tariff barriers.  
 
c) Predictability of trade through binding and tariffs: The multilateral trading system is 
driven by predictability in that governments can expect that trade barriers will not be 
raised during the course of trade.147 The WTO notes that he acknowledgment of 
member states to adhere to the principles of non-discrimination and predictability is a 
significant catalyst to achieving the aims of the WTO.148 
 
d) Transparency: Transparency as a core principle of the WTO ensures that regulations 
and policies are at the disposal of governments of member states as well as parties to 
trade so that awareness is made about the various trade rules around the world.149 
This principle also allows for the monitoring of trade measures imposed by member 
states that effect the multilateral trading system.150 
 
e) Encouragement of development: Member states have acknowledged the challenges 
that developing and least developed countries are faced with and have recognised that 
these countries obtain the necessary assistance in order to compete effectively in the 
multilateral trading system.151 Thus, this notion is effected by the introduction of 
‘special and differential treatment provisions’ in every WTO agreement,152 which allows 
developing and least developed countries preferential treatment in respect of certain 
aspects where such countries face difficulty.153 Page and Kleen154 note that the 
‘purpose of special and differential treatment provisions is to give developing countries 
																																																						
146 http://www.unitar.org/ny/sites/unitar.org.ny/files/1)%20Intro,%20Principles%20and%20 
Agreements%20May2010.pdf (Accessed 23 May 2017). 
147 Introduction to the WTO, Principles and Agreements’ 
http://www.unitar.org/ny/sites/unitar.org.ny/files/1)%20Intro,%20Principles%20and%20Agreements%2
0May2010.pdf (Accessed 23 May 2017). 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid. See also Matshusita M ‘Basic Principles of the WTO and the Role of Competition Policy’ 
Washington University Global Studies World Review Volume 3, Issue 2 (2004) p 368, 
151 Ibid. 
152 For example, Article 10 of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures contains the 
provisions on special and differential treatment for developing countries.  
153 ‘Introduction to the WTO, Principles and Agreements’ 
http://www.unitar.org/ny/sites/unitar.org.ny/files/1)%20Intro,%20Principles%20and%20Agreements%2
0May2010.pdf (Accessed 23 May 2017). See also Kleen P, Page S ‘Special and Differential 
Treatment Provisions of Developing Countries in the World Trade Organisation’ Global Development 
Studies No.2 (2005) p vii. 
154 Ibid.  
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a greater priority [of member states] to grow and develop without impeding the 
progress of others’ to give attention to their own needs and less to that of others.  
 
f) Fair competition: Competition in the WTO is encouraged to ‘promote a free an open 
trading system’.155 It involves the ‘promotion of an open market, provision of fair and 
equal business opportunities to every participant in the market, transparency and 
fairness in the regulatory process, the promotion of efficiency and the maximisation of 
consumer welfare’.156 
 
As mentioned above, the principles that underpin the multilateral trading system are a 
thread that runs through every agreement encompassed under the WTO. As such, 
these principles are, by implication, integral to the Antidumping agreement by virtue of 
being a WTO Agreement. It is thus submitted that these principles are of relevance to 
the ADA because the provisions must comply with or face being in contravention of 
the WTO principles. This research submits further that it is imperative that the 
provisions of the ADA are not construed as being a protectionist measure and should 
always reflect the ideals inherent to the WTO.  
2.4 HOW HAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WTO AFFECTED THE 
FORMATION OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT?  
As mentioned above, the first type of regulation regarding anti-dumping was 
established during the Kennedy Round, known as the Anti-Dumping Code. It was 
further revised during the Tokyo Round and was subsequently incorporated as one of 
the agreements constituting the ‘single package’ in the form of the Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade during the 
establishment of the WTO.157 Since then, all member states of the WTO are bound to 
this agreement by virtue of signing the Agreement establishing the WTO. From a 
reading on the establishment of anti-dumping practices, the Code was initially 
introduced to regulate how governments react to such cases, to eliminate the use of 
protectionism that were disguised as anti-dumping duties. This has led to mixed 
																																																						
155 Matshusita M ‘Basic Principles of the WTO and the Role of Competition Policy’ Washington 
University Global Studies World Review Volume 3, Issue 2 (2004) p 363. 
156 Ibid.  
157 ‘A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round’ 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm. (Accessed 15 June 2017).  
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feelings regarding the text of the Antidumping agreement. Lekfuangfu158 submits that 
the Code ‘was insufficient to deal with anti-dumping issues and was used instead as 
a tool for trade protectionism’.159 
 
It is thus submitted that, in recent years, developing countries have become more 
frequent users of the antidumping policy, as opposed to developed countries being 
the forerunners of the policy.160 This research submits that this ‘mimicking’ by 
developing countries of the actions of developed countries has been tailored to suit 
the needs of developing countries by protecting its domestic industries. It is true that 
the purpose of antidumping is primarily to safeguard the interests of domestic 
industries, but it should be paramount that such actions are not be used as a means 
of defeating international competition. It is submitted that the use of antidumping 
mechanisms should not act as a façade behind the promotion of trade liberalisation, 
of which international competition is a vital factor. It is also important to take 
cognisance of the ‘limitation clause’ contained in the ADA, that is, to abandon any 
investigation where the dumping margin is below 2%, that serves to prevent arbitrary 
use of antidumping measures in order to preserve the principles inherent to the WTO. 
 
The founding of the WTO during the Uruguay Round finally saw a compromise161 to 
this ambiguity in the formation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement together with Article VI 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Lekfuangfu proposes that while the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement concerns itself primarily with the action of dumping which is 
linked to predatory pricing, this does not translate to mean that dumping is in fact a 
form of predatory pricing.162 In fact, the author submits that the action of price 
discrimination is an advantage to export markets.163 In an analysis of the text of the 
																																																						
158 Lekfuangfu N ‘Rethinking the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement from A Fairness Perspective’ 
Cambridge Student Law Review (2008).  
159 Ibid at pp 304–305. 
160 Moore MO ‘Does Antidumping Use Contribute to Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries?’ 
Institute of International Economic Policy (2008) pp 1–3.  
161 Ibid at p 305.  
162 Lekfuangfu at pp 304–305.  
163 Lekfuangfu submits at p 306 that ‘[w]hile it is also true that a producer engaging in predatory 
pricing will normally practise price discrimination (since it must have a profitable market to offset the 
losses in the market that it seeks to monopolise), it does not hold that price discrimination is an 
indication that predatory pricing is taking place. In fact, price discrimination is a normal business 
practice used to maximise profits’. 
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Agreement, the author furthermore points out that one of the fundamental rationales 
against dumping is that it distorts the international market, but that the test conducted 
in order to prove that dumping has occurred is that the goods must have ‘caused injury 
to the domestic industry’.164 However, injury to the domestic industry does not mean 
there is a distortion in the international market165 This lack of fairness, as Lekfuangfu 
proposes, should be addressed in the Anti-Dumping Agreement itself in that the effect 
of these actions have a domino effect on developing countries who struggle for access 
to international markets.166 
 
On the other hand, Adamantopoulos and De Notaris submit that because the text of 
the Agreement regulates the use of anti-dumping measures which is averse to the 
principles of non-discrimination and predictability, the Agreement should be perceived 
in a more restrictive manner.167 The authors further submit that the Agreement is too 
vague and ambiguous in certain aspects which opens the door for many states to use 
these measures as a protectionist tool.168 One of the reasons put forth for this was 
because the present Anti-Dumping Agreement was one that was created out of haste 
between negotiators who embodied divergent stances during the Uruguay Round and 
as a result created ‘too many technical deficiencies’.169 
 
In light of the above, the Anti-Dumping Agreement is an effective way to curb 
unwanted trading practices within a country. It is important to note that while it is the 
actions of private companies that commit acts of dumping, the ADA imposes on 
governments to initiate action to prevent this by way of investigation and imposition of 
anti-dumping duties. It is, however, through these government bodies that the 
																																																						
164 Ibid at p 306.  
165 Ibid.  
166 Ibid at pp 307–308. Examples of the effect that antidumping can have on developing countries 
include Argentinian carbon steel exports to the US declining by 94% in 1997 subsequent to the 
imposition of an antidumping duty by the US. Furthermore, when an antidumping investigation is 
initiated, the strain on resources of developing countries are exacerbated. For example, the US 
demanding 3000 pages of financial information be translated into English against the investigation of 
electronics from Matsushita, led to Matsushita withdrawing the product from the US market rather 
than complying with the request. (http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/undpgtrade/undpgtch9.pdf 
(Accessed 15 June 2017).  
167 Adamantopoulos K, De Notaris D ‘The Future of the WTO and the Reform of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement: A Legal Perspective’ Vol 24 (2000–2001) p 33.  
168 Ibid at p 34.  
169 Ibid.  
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provisions of the ADA are misconstrued and are thus used as a protectionist tool that 
shelters such countries against international competition. Furthermore, governments 
tend to delay the process of investigations, resulting in the domestic industry totally 
collapsing. If the provisions of the ADA were established to deter such occurrences, a 
restrictive interpretation by governments should be practiced. This thus leads one to 
believe that the lacunas contained in the ADA since the formation in the Uruguay 
Round, be revised in order to suit the needs of certain countries in the current 
economic climate, as much has changed since then.  
 
The ripple effect of protectionist measures utilised within the framework of the ADA 
materialises into allowing other countries limited access to foreign markets. It 
furthermore impacts heavily in developing and least developed countries where the 
former and latter cannot compete with the barriers lifted against other thriving 
economies. It thus submitted that the text of the Anti-Dumping Agreement be 
revised170 in order to close the gaps that invite unwarranted protectionism, while 
considering the needs of developing and least developed countries. 
2.5 CONCLUSION  
This chapter ultimately contained a focus on the history of the multilateral trading 
system. The projected rise and fall of the ITO that gave way to the GATT set a climate 
for the WTO that was to come. The Rounds that gave way to the WTO had significant 
outcomes but were plagued by diversity, but ultimately served as a forum to bring 
together a variety of interpretations and views in order for the multilateral trading 
system to be one that facilitated smooth trade, despite the differences between 
nations. Further, this chapter examined how the establishment of the WTO affected 
the formation of the ADA, with a critique on how the provisions have adapted since its 
formation. Since, chapter two has now provided this historical overview, chapter three 
will put this into context by analysing provisions of the ADA and relevant cases.  
																																																						
170 Para 28 of the DOHA WTO MINISTERIAL 2001: MINISTERIAL DECLARATION 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1. See also Rai S ‘Analysis of the Draft Anti-Dumping Agreement, Chairperson's 
Text 2007 in Light of the Jurisprudential Background’ Manchester Journal of International Economic 
Law Vol 5, Issue 2 (2008) p 127.  
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CHAPTER 3:  
OVERVIEW OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE WTO  
ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, this research demonstrated the ambulatory nature of how the 
international community gained a pivotal organisation to govern its trade between 
nations. A focal point in this research, was the establishment of the policies governing 
dumping. After decades of negotiations in respect of dumping, members agreed to the 
formation of the Antidumping Agreement (ADA) during the Tokyo and Uruguay 
Rounds and as such, this chapter will seek to discuss specific provisions of the 
Agreement. In addition to identifying provisions of the ADA, relevant case law will be 
considered. Albeit not an entirely voluminous Agreement, this chapter will centralise 
the focus on particular provisions as opposed to discussing the entire agreement, due 
to the limitations imposed on this research.  
 
As such, this chapter will firstly provide a short overview on the origins of antidumping, 
as this was dealt with at length in the previous chapter,171 to provide context to the 
discussion. Following a brief history, this chapter will then proceed to provide a concise 
overview of the ADA and thereafter, seek to analyse specific provisions of the 
agreement itself.  
3.2 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ANTI-DUMPING  
As discussed in the previous chapter, antidumping has had a long history, beginning 
with the first Code established in the Kennedy Round, to the present in the form of the 
ADA. Of interest, to the research, the chapter now seeks to determine the reasons for 
the establishment of the ADA.  
 
The practice of dumping is far from novel as it can be traced back as far as the 18th 
century.172. Notice had been taken of foreign producers ‘underselling’ products and its 
																																																						
171 Chapter 2, pp 15 – 24.  
172 Grimwade N ‘Antidumping Policy: An Overview of the Research’ Centre for International Business 
Studies, Research Working Papers (2009) p 3. 
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harmful effect on the economy, and thus began the snowballing effect of different 
countries introducing antidumping legislation.173 In 1947, when the GATT governed 
the multilateral trading system,174 the international community saw the introduction of 
the Article VI of the GATT. An antidumping Code was further negotiated in the 
Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds due to shortcomings in Article VI175 and finally, lead the 
global community to the ‘Anti-Dumping Agreement’ or the ‘Agreement on the 
Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994’ during the Uruguay Round.176 The ADA 
now serves as an extension of Article VI that governs the ‘investigation, determination 
and application of antidumping duties’.177 
3.3 THE AGREEMENT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE VI OF 
GATT 1994 
Noting the diverse handling of dumping in the territory of member states, the ADA 
sought to instill a more uniformed approach. Thus, Article VI and the ADA work 
concurrently, as stated in Article 1 of the ADA. ‘Dumping’ is seen to have occurred 
when: 
 
‘…products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country 
at less than the normal value of the products … is to be condemned if it causes 
or threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a 
contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic 
industry’.178 
 
																																																						
173 Examples included Canada in 1904, New Zealand in 1905, Australia in 1906 and finally by the 
United States in 1916. See Grimwade p 3.  
174 Crossick S ‘International Trade: The Rise and Fall of the Havana Charter’ 
https://crossick.blogactiv.eu/2009/06/04/international-trade-the-rise-fall-of-the-havana-charter/ 
(Accessed 22 June 2017).  
175 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (Accessed 23 June 2017). These 
included requiring a determination of material injury, but failing to provide criteria as to how to do so, 
in a general manner.  
176 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (Accessed 23 June 2017). 
177 Ibid. 
178 Article VI of GATT. 
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In addition to the definition, Article VI furthermore provides criteria as to what 
constitutes a product ‘at less than normal value’.179 As a result of the foreseeable 
damage that dumping potentially has on a domestic industry, the GATT and later, the 
ADA provided for the use of antidumping duties in order to offset any injury caused by 
the dumped products.180 Vermulst181 argues that an enquiry as to ‘whether dumping 
has caused material injury to the domestic injury of the like product in the importing 
country is comprised of four sub-investigations:  
 
(1) the definition of the like product; 
(2) the definition of the affected domestic industry;  
(3) the materiality of the injury; and  
(4) the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury’. 
 
Again, in response, to the varied responses to dumping, the ADA, further provides a 
substantial guideline on the use, implementation and determination of such 
antidumping levies that are encompassed in various articles in the Agreement. Due to 
the nature of this research, the study is limited to particular provisions, and thus, will 
be discussed throughout this chapter.  
3.3.1 Article 2 of the ADA – Determination of Dumping  
As stated above, Article 2.2 of the ADA provides a guideline in which the use of 
antidumping duties is permitted as well as determining whether ‘sales below cost’ are 
																																																						
179 ‘For the purposes of this Article, a product is to be considered as being introduced into the 
commerce of an importing country at less than its normal value, if the price of the product exported 
from one country to another: 
(a) is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when 
destined for consumption in the exporting country, or 
(b)  in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either: 
(i) the highest comparable price for the like product for export to any third country in the 
ordinary course of trade, or 
(ii) the cost of production of the product in the country of origin plus a reasonable addition for 
selling cost and profit.’ See also Article 2.1 of ADA. 
180 Article VI of GATT and Article 1 of the ADA. 
181 Vermulst E ‘Injury Determinations in Antidumping Investigations in the United States and the 
European Community’ New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law Vol 7 
(1986) p 305.  
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in the ‘ordinary course of trade’.182 Such calculation is known as the ‘dumping margin’ 
in which the duty is calculated by the difference of the price of the ‘dumped product’ 
and the ‘normal price’ of the product.183 
 
It should be noted that the ‘normal value’ is interpreted to be the price of the product 
in the domestic market and the ADA encompasses this definition in the determination 
of the act of dumping. Thus, the export price is evaluated at the aforementioned value, 
and does not take into the account the costs of production.184 It is submitted, therefore, 
that the increase in antidumping investigations with this rationale as a foundation may 
at times, find governments using this as a competitive advantage in order to impose 
an antidumping duty. The standard, as this research submits, is minimal and could 
account for the rising toll in developing countries implementing antidumping 
measures.185 This chapter submits that this is a clear protectionist shield against 
foreign competitors. Grimwade argues that it is not always a clear case that the costs 
of production are negated as governments make use of a price in a developing country 
or even a constructed value.186 
 
Article 2.2 furthermore states that should there be ‘incomparable sales’ in a domestic 
market because sales are ‘few, non-existent, or at below cost prices’, then the use of 
the normal value from a third country should be used, or a ‘constructive value’187 
should be used in place of the normal value.188 The result of such calculation and its 
relation to the imposition of anti-dumping duties will be discussed later in the chapter 
with reference to article 5 of the ADA. 
																																																						
182 https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/anti_dumping_01_e.htm (Accessed 
30 July 2017).  
183 Bhala R ‘Rethinking Antidumping Law’ George Washington International Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol 29 (1995–1996) p 64. Bhala notes an interpretation of a ‘normal price’ to be ‘the 
foreign home market price of a ‘foreign like product’ sold in the ordinary course of trade (i.e., not to a 
related party or below cost) for consumption in the exporter's country’. 
184 Grimwade at p 8.  
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid. 
187 This refers ‘to the total cost of production including the actual costs of materials, labour and 
overheads incurred for the production of the goods sold in the comparison market, plus selling, 
general and administrative expenses’ – taken from article 2.2.1 of ADA. See also Fillis JB Assessing 
the Determination of Constructed Normal Value in the 2000 USA Antidumping Poultry Case in South 
Africa (Published LLM Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2016) p 18. 
188 Bhala at p 64. 
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Moreover, throughout the Agreement, there are several mentions of the term ‘like 
product’ beginning in Article 2. For purposes of clarity, article 2.6 has defined the term 
to mean ‘a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under 
consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which, although 
not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product 
under consideration’. In other words, the ‘like product must be identical in all respects 
in order for antidumping regulations to be applied’.189 Notwithstanding this definition, 
and reference being made to it throughout key articles and determinations throughout 
the ADA, it has opened the door for disputes regarding the elements of what 
constitutes a like product.190 
 
An example of a conflict of this nature was the imposition of an antidumping duty on 
an exported product and such product has been modified by the exporter in order to 
be removed from the ‘original product category’.191 Where the modification is of such 
an extensive nature so that it is no longer a ‘like product’ of the original product, the 
antidumping duty on the exported product falls away.192 The Footwear from China and 
Indonesia case193 saw the Commission establishing a ‘two-way interchangeability 
test’,194 in ascertaining what constituted a ‘like product’ (discussed further on). 
 
In this case, the Commission was notified of an imposition of antidumping duties on 
certain footwear originating from the People’s Republic of China and Indonesia, 
justified by the material injury of European Confederation of the Footwear Industry 
(CEC), which accounts for a significant proportion of the footwear industry in the 
																																																						
189 Mattar A ‘Legal Analysis of Anti-Dumping Cases Raised against Saudi Arabia's Petrochemical 
Products’ Global Journal of Human-Social Science Vol 15 (2014) p 23–24. 
190 http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/gCT9905e.html. (Accessed 1 August 2017).  
191 Matsushita M ‘Some International and Domestic Antidumping Issues’ Asian Journal of WTO and 
International Health Law and Policy, Vol 5 (2010) p 252. See also Choi, ‘Like Products’ in 
International Trade Law – Towards a Consistent GATT/WTO Jurisprudence, Oxford University Press 
(2003). 
192 Mattar at pp 23–24.  
193 The COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 165/97 of 28 January 1997 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of certain footwear with textile uppers originating in the People's 
Republic of China and Indonesia. 
194 Adamantopoulos K, De Notaris D ‘The Future of the WTO and the Reform of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement: A Legal Perspective’ Vol 24 (2000–2001) p 37.  
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European Community.195 The Commission introduced the two-part test in determining 
a ‘like product’ as ‘the general technical or physical characteristics, the use or functions 
and finally, the consumer's perception of products, and not the method used for their 
production’.196 However, favour was not granted to the EU as the test was satisfied in 
only one part,197 and not in the other.198  
3.3.2 Article 3 of the ADA – Determination of Injury  
As mentioned above, in order for an antidumping duty to be imposed on an imported 
product, the preliminary test that must be satisfied is firstly, the act of ‘dumping’ must 
have occurred and secondly, the act of ‘dumping’ must have caused injury to the 
domestic industry.199 One of the issues with Article VI of the GATT was that there were 
insufficiencies regarding the definition of what constituted material injury to a domestic 
industry.200 
 
However, at the establishment of the ADA, only the term ‘injury’ was defined.201 
Soprano202 shed light on this by referring to the French and Spanish versions of the 
ADA in interpreting the term ‘material’. The author furthermore makes use of what the 
Appellate Body has defined the term to be in a Safeguard case:203 
																																																						
195 Paragraph 1 and 2 of the COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 165/97 of 28 January 1997 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain footwear with textile uppers originating 
in the People's Republic of China and Indonesia http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri= 
CELEX%3A31997R0165. (Accessed on 28 June 2017). 
196 Paragraph 18 of the COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 165/97 of 28 January 1997 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain footwear with textile uppers originating in the 
People's Republic of China and Indonesia. 
197 The Commission determined that slippers could be substituted by outdoor shoes for indoor shoes’. 
See Adamantopoulos et al, at p 37. 
198 ‘The Commission could not determine that outdoor shoes could be replaced by slippers for outdoor 
use, due to slippers’ ‘usual flimsiness’’. See Adamantopoulos et al at p 37.  
199 Article 1 of ADA. 
200 Graham at p 162. 
201 Article 3, footnote 9 of ADA states that injury ‘shall, unless otherwise specified, be taken to mean 
material injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material 
retardation of the establishment of such an industry and shall be interpreted in accordance with the 
provisions of this Article’. 
202 See Soprano R ‘The Threat of Material Injury in Antidumping Investigations: A Threat to Free 
Trade’ Vol 11 (2010) p 68. 
203 Appellate Body Report, United States – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or 
Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia (US- Lamb), WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R, 
1 May 2001, para. 124 and footnote 77. See Soprano R ‘The Threat of Material Injury in Antidumping 
Investigations: A Threat to Free Trade’ Vol 11 (2010) p 68. ‘This means, for example, that short-term 
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‘material’ is to be interpreted as ‘less strict’ than ‘serious’.  
 
Interestingly, the ADA has provided states with a broad scope of how to react to cases 
of dumping, as Article 3 prescribes that a member state of the WTO can impose an 
antidumping duty on an imported product, even when the injury has not yet 
materialised.204 
 
Thus, in terms of article 3.1 of the ADA, determination of injury must be based on the 
following: 
 
‘positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume 
of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the 
domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these 
imports on domestic producers of such products’.  
 
In interpreting this article, in almost its entirety, the Appellate Body has provided an 
explanation for precise adherence by member states. In the case of United States – 
Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US-
Hot Rolled Steel),205 an antidumping investigation was initiated by the United States 
Department of Commerce (USDOC) on imports of hot-rolled steel from, inter alia, 
Japan.206 Because of the vast number of Japanese producers and exporters, the 
USDOC had elected to conduct its investigation on a ‘sample of Japanese 
producers’.207 The USDOC established a ‘single rate’ of antidumping duty on the 
producers individually investigated, while calculating an ‘all others rate’ on other 
producers not individually investigated.208 Upon the conclusion of the investigation, 
the United States International Trade Commission, found in the affirmative that 
																																																						
injury shall be excluded as well as in the cases where the injury suffered by the domestic industry is 
limited and does not lead to any significant economic problem or shown by only a few factors.’ 
204 Soprano at p 70. 
205 WT/DS 184/AB/R, 24 July 2001. 
206 Ibid at para 2. 
207 Ibid.  
208 Ibid. 
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dumping had indeed occurred by the Japanese on imports of hot-rolled steel, and 
consequently imposed an antidumping duty on the aforementioned.209 
 
This chapter disagrees with the position used by the United States International Trade 
Commission as the approach that was used is not in line with international standards. 
Furthermore, this standard embodies a discriminatory stance and is averse to the 
principle of harmonisation.  
 
In respect of article 3.1, the Appellate Body held that that the provision ‘sets forth a 
Member's fundamental, substantive obligation with respect to the injury 
determination’.210 The Body furthermore declared that ‘positive evidence’ mentioned 
in the article refers ‘to the quality of the evidence that authorities may rely upon in 
making a determination’.211 The Appellate Body moreover confirmed that the term 
‘positive’ in the context of this provision, is interpreted to the Body as evidence being 
of an ‘affirmative, objective and verifiable character, and that it must be credible’.212 It 
seems that this allows investigating authorities to ‘base its determination on all relevant 
reasoning and facts before it’.213 
 
The second enquiry of article 3.1 of the ADA which mentions that evidence should 
also be of an ‘objective examination’ was further given acknowledgment by the 
Appellate Body in US Hot-Rolled Steel. It was held that this stage of the enquiry is 
‘concerned with the investigative process itself’.214 The Body affirmed that ‘the word 
‘objective’, which qualifies the word ‘examination’, indicates essentially that the 
‘examination’ process must conform to the dictates of the basic principles of good faith 
and fundamental fairness’.215 Within the context of dumping, this provision obliges 
																																																						
209 Ibid.  
210 Ibid at note 36, para 106. 
211 Ibid at para 192. 
212 Ibid.  
213 Appellate Body Report, Thailand- Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or 
Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland (Thailand- H-Beams), WT/DS 122/AB/R, 12 March 2001, 
para. 111. See Soprano at p 69. 
214 WT/DS 184/AB/R, 24 July 2001, para 193. 
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39	
	
member states to commit to investigations into dumping being done in a manner that 
is unbiased and does not favour any party concerned.216 
 
In addition, Article 3.4 was afforded mention in the Hot-Rolled Steel case. The Body 
held that this article imposes an obligation for investigating authorities to evaluate 
certain factors that are relevant to investigations.217 However, the listed factors do not 
equate to being confined to such and rather ‘extends to all economic factors’.218 
 
Moreover, Article 3.5 of the ADA includes in this provision, the element of causation 
which is essential for consideration in the determination of an antidumping duty. This 
provision imposes an obligation on investigating authorities to demonstrate a causal 
link ‘between the volume of dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry’ 
thereof. Bhala219 adds with reference to the Hot-Rolled Steel case220 that causation 
involves a five-part enquiry. Thus: 
 
‘An investigating authority must:  
(1) identify factors that could be causing injury to the petitioning industry, 	
(2) check to see these factors are operating simultaneously,221 
(3) examine all of these known factors to see if they indeed are having an 
injurious effect,  
(4) distinguish between two categories of known factors, namely, the injurious 
effects of dumped imports versus the injurious effects of all other known 
factors, and  
(5) ensure that the damage done by other factors is not attributed to the 
dumped imports.’  
																																																						
216 Ibid.  
217 Ibid at para 194. 
218 Ibid. Examples of such factors are ‘the volume and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices, 
contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive practices of and 
competition between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in technology and the export 
performance and productivity of the domestic industry’, among others. Taken from  
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/anti_dumping_02_e.htm (Accessed 
31 July 2017). 
219 Bhala at p 997. 
220 WT/DS 184/AB/R, 24 July 2001, para 222. 
221 Factors 1 and 2 are taken from the Hot-Rolled Steel case at para 222. 
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This chapter has discussed before that an antidumping duty can be imposed even 
where the injury has not yet materialised.222 Article 3.7 of the ADA elaborates on this 
point and provides a criterion which must be considered in totality, and not treated as 
consideration of one or another.223 This provision states that ‘a determination of a 
threat of material injury shall be based on facts and not merely on allegation, 
conjecture or remote possibility’, which Soprano qualifies as a limitation in order to 
‘limit risks of arbitrariness’.224 The provision furthermore eliminates the possibility of 
futile investigations by stating that the threat must clearly be ‘foreseen and imminent’. 
At footnote 10 of article 3.7, the ADA provides a non-exclusive example of what 
constitutes a threat of injury that is foreseeable and imminent, which is:  
 
‘.. there is convincing reason to believe that there will be, in the near future, 
substantially increased importation of the product at dumped prices’.  
 
The open-endedness of the term ‘threat of material injury’ was significantly curbed in 
the case of Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup 
(HFCS) from the United States Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United 
States225 (Mexico – Corn Syrup case), in which the Appellate Body provided clarity. 
In this case, the antidumping investigating authority of Mexico imposed an 
antidumping duty on imports of HFCS (which is a sweetener used in soft drinks as well 
as in other products) from the United States and alleged that the imports were being 
																																																						
222 Article 3, footnote 9 of ADA. 
223 In making a determination regarding the existence of a threat of material injury, the authorities 
should consider, inter alia, such factors as:  
1. (i) a significant rate of increase of dumped imports into the domestic market indicating the 
likelihood of substantially increased importation;  
2. (ii) sufficient freely disposable, or an imminent, substantial increase in, capacity of the exporter 
indicating the likelihood of substantially increased dumped exports to the importing 
Member's market, taking into account the availability of other export markets to absorb any 
additional exports;  
3. (iii) whether imports are entering at prices that will have a significant depressing or suppressing 
effect on domestic prices, and would likely increase demand for further imports; and  
4. (iv) inventories of the product being investigated.  
No one of these factors by itself can necessarily give decisive guidance but the totality of the factors 
considered must lead to the conclusion that further dumped exports are imminent and that, unless 
protective action is taken, material injury would occur.’ 
224 Soprano at p 70. 
225 WT/DS132/AB/RW, 22 October 2001. 
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dumped in the Mexican domestic industry and further, threatened to cause material 
injury to the sugar industry.226 The US challenged this reasoning on the basis of the 
‘threat of injury analysis being flawed in several respects’.227 
 
The Body provided that in order to determine a threat of material injury, the relevant 
investigating authorities would have to result in assumptions in relation to the 
‘occurrence of future events since future events can never be definitively proven by 
facts’.228 The Body furthermore argued that despite the uncertainty of postulating 
future events, the investigating authorities must provide a ‘proper establishment of 
facts’ when determining a threat of material injury must, unequivocally, ‘be based on 
events that, although they have not yet occurred, must be clearly foreseen and 
imminent’.229 
 
Due to the reasonable doubt following a threat of material injury to a domestic industry, 
article 3.8 concludes article 3 by stating such case ‘must be considered and decided 
with absolute care’. It is thus submitted that the expansive nature of the provisions 
involving injury is in fact necessary, so as to prevent futile investigations from 
occurring. As dumping is a means of distorting international market competition, the 
allegations against this act, when it does occur, must be treated in all its seriousness 
as the use of antidumping tariffs impacts on the principles of the WTO such as the 
MFN principle and the encouragement of international competition. This research 
furthermore submits that this requirement is in fact, paramount, as the damage caused 
by dumping to domestic industries has the potential of collapsing entire industries 
resulting in substantial job loss and decrease in economic growth.230 
																																																						
226 https://ustr.gov/archive/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2001/October/US_Wins_WTO_ 
Antidumping_Case_on_High_Fructose_Corn_Syrup.html (Accessed 3 July 2017). 
227 Ibid. 
228 Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HRFS) from the United States 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States WT/DS132/AB/RW, 22 October 2001, para 
85, taken from Appellate Body Report, United States – Lamb Safeguard, WT/DS177/AB/R, 
WT/DS178/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2001, para 136. 
229 Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HRFS) from the United States 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States WT/DS132/AB/RW, 22 October 2001, para 
85 in reference to United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from 
Japan (US-Hot Rolled Steel) WT/DS 184/AB/R, 24 July 2001 at para 56. See also Article 3.7 of the 
ADA. 
230 http://ewn.co.za/2017/03/23/sapa-dumping-behind-sa-poultry-crisis (Accessed 11 July 2017). The 
act of poultry dumping in South Africa by the EU has resulted in the SA Poultry Industry losing up to 
200 000 employees. A further example of the effects of dumping was the steel industry that was on 
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3.3.3 Article 4 of the ADA – Definition of a Domestic Industry  
A further element in the antidumping equation is found in article 4, which defines a 
domestic industry. The provision follows that: 
 
‘In determining injury or threat thereof, a 'domestic industry' shall be understood 
to mean the producers as a whole of the like or directly competitive products 
operating within the territory of a Member, or those whose collective output of 
the like or directly competitive products constitutes a major proportion of the 
total domestic production of those products’.231 
 
Lee has argued that the text of this provision has been constructed in a rather 
‘restrictive’ manner by only limiting the injury to domestic industries.232 The result of 
this restriction is that other role players in the domestic market are ignored.233 In an 
international context, the author further argues that this provision permits governments 
																																																						
the verge of collapse due to dumping of steel products (as well as the oversupply of steel by China 
that led to the Chinese market crash) by China in South Africa and other global markets, and 
commodity prices began to slump across the world. See http://aidc.org.za/crises-steel-mining-mean-
south-african-economy/ (Accessed 10 September 2017). Because of the oversupply by China, steel 
companies such as Evraz Highveld Steel and Vanadium closed down in February 2016, and 
retrenched over 2 000 employees. See https://mg.co.za/article/2016-04-07-sas-steel-industry-on-
brink-of-collapse (Accessed 10 September 2017). 
231 Article 4.1 of the ADA ‘For the purposes of this Agreement, the term ‘domestic industry’ shall be 
interpreted as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them 
whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production 
of those products, except that:  
1. (i) when producers are related to the exporters or importers or are themselves importers 
of the allegedly dumped product, the term ‘domestic industry’ may be interpreted as 
referring to the rest of the producers;  
2. (ii) in exceptional circumstances the territory of a Member may, for the production in 
question, be divided into two or more competitive markets and the producers within 
each market may be regarded as a separate industry if: 
(a) the producers within such market sell all or almost all of their production of the 
product in question in that market, and 
(b) the demand in that market is not to any substantial degree supplied by producers 
of the product in question located elsewhere in the territory. 
In such circumstances, injury may be found to exist even where a major portion of the total domestic 
industry is not injured, provided there is a concentration of dumped imports into such an isolated 
market and provided further that the dumped imports are causing injury to the producers of all or 
almost all of the production within such market.’  
232 Lee JS A Critical Analysis of the Antidumping Policy at the Multilateral and Regional Levels: The 
Potential Influence of Europe’s Trade Power for Possible Reform (Published LLM Thesis, University 
of Hamburg, 2012) p 12. See article 4.1(i) of ADA at footnote 53. 
233 Other role players include domestic importers, retailers and consumers. See Lee JS A Critical 
Analysis of the Antidumping Policy at the Multilateral and Regional Levels: The Potential Influence of. 
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to neglect any other type of injury to ‘domestic welfare and competition caused by the 
imposition of an [antidumping] measure’.234 On quite the adverse view, the Panel in 
the European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron 
or Steel Fasteners from China (EC-Fasteners) case has held that ‘the use of the 
term ‘may’’ in article 4.1 makes it clear that the investigating authorities are not 
required to exclude related producers or importing producers’. The Panel moreover 
stated that ‘there is nothing in article 3.1 or article 4.1 [of the ADA] that limits the 
discretion of investigating authorities to exclude, or not, related or importing 
producers’.235 
 
The Panel in Mexico-Corn Syrup confirmed that article 4.1 and footnote 9 of article 
3:  
 
‘inescapably require the conclusion that the domestic industry with respect to 
which injury is considered and determined must be the domestic industry 
defined in accordance with Article 4.1’.236 
 
The domestic industry requirement in the ADA carries in itself, a significance. It forms 
an integral part in the imposition of antidumping duties, and without definition of what 
constitutes such, there would be far too many questions unanswered in respect of 
dumping. It can be argued, in this opinion of this chapter, that without a definition of a 
domestic industry, there would be no harm committed and inevitably, there would be 
no agreement governing the use of antidumping duties. This chapter is in agreement 
with the EC Fasteners case in that the term domestic industry is none but an umbrella 
term, which encompasses the many role players who are affected when dumping is 
found to have occurred.  
  
																																																						
234 Lee, at p 12.  
235 Panel Report of European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or 
Steel Fasteners from China WT/DS397/R 3 December 2010 para 7.244 (own emphasis added). See 
also https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/anti_dumping_02_e.htm#fnt-451 
(Accessed 6 July 2017.2017). 
236 Panel Report Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HRFS) from the 
United States Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States WT/DS132/AB/RW, 
22 October 2001 para 7.147. See also https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e 
/anti_dumping_02_e.htm#fnt-451 (Accessed 6 July 2017.2017). 
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3.3.4 Article 5 of the ADA – Initiation and Subsequent Investigation into 
Alleged Acts of Dumping  
The importance of defining the relevant domestic industry is followed through in article 
5.1 of the ADA which states that:  
 
‘[e]xcept as provided for in paragraph 6, an investigation to determine the 
existence, degree and effect of any alleged dumping shall be initiated upon a 
written application by or on behalf of the domestic industry’. 
 
The text in article 5 sets out strict procedures in which an investigation into dumping 
which must be adhered to,237 as the investigation process is paramount before any 
anti-dumping duty is imposed.238 As such, Article 5.1 is to be read concurrently with 
paragraph 4 of article 5 as the provision places an obligation on the relevant authorities 
to ascertain whether the petition made (to conduct an investigation into alleged 
dumping practices) has garnered adequate support from the domestic industry and 
directs that the ‘petition be supported by domestic producers that account for: 
 
(a) at least 25% of domestic production; and  
(b) more than 50% of production by producers who either support or oppose 
the application’.239 
 
Appleton and Plummer found that the purpose for the test at (b) was to prevent 
petitions being made where more opposition than support was established, ‘even if 
the 25% minimum was met’ and further acknowledged that some domestic producers 
prefer to remain neutral in certain circumstances.240 In United States – Continued 
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (US Byrd Amendment case),241 
Australia, Brazil, Chile and the European Communities, and subsequently, Canada 
																																																						
237 International Trade Law Centre, Appleton E, Plummer MG The World Trade Organization: Legal, 
Economic and Political Analysis Springer Science and Business Media (2007) p 510. 
238 Article 1 of the ADA. 
239 Appleton, Plummer at p 510.  
240 Ibid.  
241 Appellate Body Report United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (US 
Byrd Amendment case) WT/DS217/AB/R WT/DS234/AB/R 16 January 2003. 
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and Mexico, requested the establishment of a Panel to assess the ‘WTO-consistency 
of the United States Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000’.242 In respect of article 
5.4 of the ADA, the Appellate Body overturned the Panel’s reasoning with regard to 
the aforementioned provision and held that there is no ‘requirement for investigating 
authorities to examine the motives producers that elect to support (or to oppose the 
application)’.243 The Body furthermore termed this to be ‘difficult, if not impossible, as 
a practical matter, to engage in that exercise‘.244 
 
In addition to article 5.1, article 5.2 of the ADA, inevitably, provides criteria in order to 
support such investigations as ‘evidence required for initiation’.245 The provision states 
that: 
 
‘[a]n application under paragraph 1 shall include evidence of: 
(a) dumping,  
(b) injury within the meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by this 
Agreement and 
(c) a causal link between the dumped imports and the alleged injury. 
 
Simple assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence, cannot be considered 
sufficient to meet the requirements of this paragraph’.  
 
Paragraph 2 of article 5 furthermore mandates investigating authorities to supplement 
the proposed investigation with further particulars246 in order to ‘prevent a proliferation 
																																																						
242 Ibid at paras 2–3. 
243 Ibid at paras 288–291.  
244 Ibid para 291. 
245 Appleton; Plummer at p 510.  
246 ‘The application shall contain such information as is reasonably available to the applicant on the 
following:  
(i) the identity of the applicant and a description of the volume and value of the domestic 
production of the like product by the applicant. Where a written application is made on 
behalf of the domestic industry, the application shall identify the industry on behalf of which 
the application is made by a list of all known domestic producers of the like product (or 
associations of domestic producers of the like product) and, to the extent possible, a 
description of the volume and value of domestic production of the like product accounted 
for by such producers;  
(ii) a complete description of the allegedly dumped product, the names of the country or 
countries of origin or export in question, the identity of each known exporter or foreign 
producer and a list of known persons importing the product in question;  
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of vexatious and baseless investigations and obviate the potential and actual abuse 
of process’ which is given authority by article 5.3 as it obliges ‘investigating authorities 
to examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the application to 
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an 
investigation’.247 WTO panels have made mention of this provision allowing a wide 
discretion in this assessment.248 In the Guatemala – Cement II case, the Panel held 
that the investigating authorities are not confined to the limits of this provision, and 
may thus gather information from other sources.249 More so, the Panel in Mexico-Corn 
Syrup stated that the ‘quantity and quality of evidence required at this stage is less 
than that required at the preliminary or final determination of dumping or injury’ and 
furthermore held that the investigating authority need not solve all underlying issues 
of fact. 250 
 
Article 5.5 of the ADA prohibits investigating authorities from publicising any 
application for the initiation of an investigation unless a decision has been taken to 
initiate an investigation. It does however, prescribe authorities to notify the government 
of the exporting member after receipt of a documented application and before 
commencement of an investigation. Appleton and Plummer qualify the reason for this 
																																																						
(iii) information on prices at which the product in question is sold when destined for 
consumption in the domestic markets of the country or countries of origin or export (or, 
where appropriate, information on the prices at which the product is sold from the country 
or countries of origin or export to a third country or countries, or on the constructed value 
of the product) and information on export prices or, where appropriate, on the prices at 
which the product is first resold to an independent buyer in the territory of the importing 
Member;  
(iv) information on the evolution of the volume of the allegedly dumped imports, the effect of 
these imports on prices of the like product in the domestic market and the consequent 
impact of the imports on the domestic industry, as demonstrated by relevant factors and 
indices having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry, such as those listed in 
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 3.’ 
247 Article 5.3. See also Ndlovu L ‘An Assessment of the WTO Compliance of the Recent Regulatory 
Regime of South Africa's dumping and anti-dumping Law’ Journal of International Law and 
Technology Vol 5, Issue 1 (2010) p 32.  
248 Appleton, Plummer at p 511. 
249 Panel Report Guatemala – Definitive Antidumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from 
Mexico WT/DS156/R 2000 para 8.62. 
250 Panel Report Mexico- Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HRCS) from the 
United States Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States WT/DS132/AB/RW, 22 
October 2001 para 7.94, para 7.110. see also Ibid, Appleton; Plummer.  
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requirement as preventing ‘industry uncertainty and disruption that would be likely to 
occur’ once an investigation had begun.251 
 
As an exception to article 5.1, article 5.6 of the ADA provides that the investigating 
authorities are permitted to conduct an investigation into alleged dumping without 
written application by or on behalf of a domestic industry, provided that such 
authorities have sufficient evidence of dumping, injury and a causal link. Article 5.7 of 
the ADA specifies a time frame in respect of the evidence previously mentioned, and 
prescribes that the evidence of dumping and injury must be considered simultaneously 
in the pending decision of whether or not an investigation will be conducted and 
throughout the investigation at a date no later than the earliest of which provisional 
antidumping measures may be applied.  
 
Instructions on the conclusion or termination of investigations are found in article 5.8 
in the ADA. This article mandates that there will be immediate termination in cases 
where authorities ‘determine that the margin of dumping is de minimis or that the 
volume of dumped imports, actual or potential is negligible’. The text furthermore 
clarifies that de minimis accounts for a margin of less than 2% and the volume of 
dumped imports are qualified as negligible of the volume of dumped imports from a 
country has accounted for less than 3% of imports of the like product from the 
importing member. Should individual countries account for less than 3% of imports of 
the like product in the importing member, but collectively account for more than 7% of 
imports of the like product in the importing country, the de minimis margin still applies.  
 
In this respect, the Appellate Body in the case of Mexico – definitive anti-dumping 
measures on beef and rice (Mexico – Anti-Dumping Duties on Rice),252 found in 
agreement with the Panel in that it noted that ‘the second sentence of Article 5.8 
requires the immediate termination of the investigation in respect of exporters for 
which an individual margin of dumping of zero or de minimis is determined’.253 The 
Body held that ‘for the purposes of Article 5.8, there is one investigation and not as 
																																																						
251 Appleton, Plummer at p 512. 
252 Appellate Body Report WT/DS295/AB/R 29 November 2005. 
253 Ibid at para 217. 
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many investigations as there are exporters or foreign producers’.254 It further gave 
more clarity to this and stated that ‘that there is a single investigation, and that Article 
5.8 requires the ‘immediate termination’ of this investigation in respect of the individual 
exporter or producer for which a zero or de minimis margin is established’.255 The Body 
furthermore confirmed that the ‘margin of dumping’ shall refer to the ‘individual margin 
of dumping of an exporter or producer rather than a country – wide margin of dumping’, 
one that is consistent with the definition contained in article 2.4.2.256 
  
The Panel noted in US – Drams257 that where the de minimis test is concerned, it is 
concerned solely with the provisions of article 5.8 and must be distinguished from any 
other test.258 Lastly, Article 5.10 concludes this section by stating that, save for 
exceptional cases, investigations must be concluded within one year and must not 
continue for more than 18 months.  
3.3.5 Article 11 of the ADA – Duration and Review of Anti-Dumping Duties and 
Price Undertakings  
A limitation that is imposed on the imposition of anti-dumping duties can be found in 
article 11 of the ADA which details inter alia, the duration of anti-dumping duties.259 
																																																						
254 Ibid at para 218. 
255 Ibid.  
256 Ibid at para 216. 
257 United States Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) 
of One Megabit or Above from Korea WT/DS99/R 29 January. 
258 Ibid at para 6.89 – 6.90. 
259 ‘11.1 An anti-dumping duty shall remain in force only as long as and to the extent necessary to 
counteract dumping which is causing injury.  
‘11.2 The authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty, where 
warranted, on their own initiative or, provided that a reasonable period of time has elapsed since the 
imposition of the definitive anti-dumping duty, upon request by any interested party which submits 
positive authorities to examine whether the continued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset 
dumping, whether the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied, or 
both. If, as a result of the review under this paragraph, the authorities determine that the anti-dumping 
duty is no longer warranted, it shall be terminated immediately.  
 ‘11.3 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, any definitive anti-dumping duty shall 
be terminated on a date not later than five years from its imposition (or from the date of the most 
recent review under paragraph 2 if that review has covered both dumping and injury, or under this 
paragraph), unless the authorities determine, in a review initiated before that date on their own 
initiative or upon a duly substantiated request made by or on behalf of the domestic industry within a 
reasonable period of a time prior to that date, that the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to 
continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. The duty may remain in force pending the outcome 
of such a review.  
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This provision imposes an obligation on national authorities to ‘establish mandatory 
reviews of anti-dumping duties after five years from the initial imposition’.260 This is 
universally known as the ‘sunset review’.261 The rationale for such a review stated by 
Pattison,262 and is further confirmed by article 11.1 of the ADA, is that ‘anti-dumping 
duties should remain in force only so long as they [are] generally necessary to 
counteract dumping which [is] causing or threatening material injury to a domestic 
industry’.263 In the absence of evidence showing that the removal of the duties will lead 
to the continuation of injury on the domestic industry, the anti-dumping duties will thus 
be terminated.264 The introduction of the sunset review proceedings, which were 
incorporated during the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations, have been in force 
since the signing of the Final Act in 1994.265 
 
A unique provision that is article 11, along with a few others, it further provides detailed 
proceedings that require strict adherence by the respective investigating authorities in 
which other provisions in the ADA do not.266 It is thus submitted, that the inclusion of 
sunset review proceedings seems to eliminate the possibility of excluding international 
markets entirely, thereby removing the protectionist connotations that are implicitly 
attached to anti-dumping duties.  
  
																																																						
 ‘11.4 The provisions of Article 6 regarding evidence and procedure shall apply to any review 
carried out under this Article. Any such review shall be carried out expeditiously and shall normally be 
concluded within 12 months of the date of initiation of the review.  
‘11.5 The provisions of this Article shall apply mutatis mutandis to price undertakings accepted 
under Article 8.’ 
260 Sohn C ‘Current Developments of WTO Dispute Settlement Body Findings on the US Antidumping 
Sunset Review Regime’ Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business (2006) p 179. 
261 Hurrabiell at p 596, footnote 191. ‘‘Sunset indicates the termination of a dumping duty assessment 
against a producer, if no other action is taken, after five years have passed. These provisions specify 
an end-point for the levying of an antidumping duty which activates automatically rather than requiring 
respondent to petition for termination.’ 
262 Pattison JE Antidumping Duties and Countervailing Laws (2005) p 6.  
263 Sohn at page 179.  
264 article 11.3 of ADA. 
265 Pattison at p 30 – 31.  
266 Sohn at p 180. Examples include ‘Article 11.4 states that provisions of Article 6 regarding evidence 
and procedure shall be applied to sunset reviews. Article 18.3.2 provides transitory measures for the 
antidumping duty orders imposed before the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. In this 
respect, sunset reviews differ from original investigations that is governed by extensive legal and 
procedural framework provided in Articles 3 and 5 of the AD.’ 
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3.4 CONCLUSION  
This chapter analysed analysing the focal elements involved in antidumping 
determinations contained in the ADA. The analysis of the above provisions presents 
the argument that the investigation process in respect of article 5 of the ADA is flawed 
due to the lack of impartiality, which is the foundation of most adjudication 
proceedings.267 Further, the provisions found in the ADA were primarily enacted to 
control the reactions of governments to acts of dumping within the borders of a 
country, and it is in the opinion of this research, that the ADA is a tool made to come 
to the aid of the affected country. Notwithstanding this statement, it is further submitted 
that parties to the investigation be afforded proper representation, which is granted by 
the ADA.268 
 
However, this should be done in a manner that does not put a strain on the responding 
member due to strict time constraints. Furthermore, this research argues that it is in 
the interests of fairness, that the country alleging dumping not construe the provisions 
into a protectionist shield as it places administrative and economic burdens on 
countries that may otherwise not have the means to respond adequately to allegations 
made. The case law mentioned have further provided insight and clarity as to the 
interpretation of these elements, in an attempt to prevent any harm caused by dumping 
through the lens of the ADA. The following chapter will proceed to discuss dumping 
laws and regulations in South Africa and its establishment thereof and will further this 
country’s stance in relation to free trade and whether dumping in the country has 
affected its adherence to this principle, as part of the general theme of the research.  
  
																																																						
267 Cho S ‘Anticompetitive Trade Remedies: How Antidumping Measures Obstruct Market 
Competition’ North Carolina Law Review Vol 87 (2009) p 386 – 387. 
268 Article 17.  
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CHAPTER 4:  
SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS ROLE IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM  
IN RESPECT OF DUMPING  
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
It is common cause that developed countries dominate the playing field in the world of 
international trade due to their wide access to many opportunities, skills and resources 
that many developing countries may not possess. If one has to narrow the 
kaleidoscopic connotations to this statement, it is easy to point out that in the field of 
dumping and anti-dumping activities, developed countries have thus in the past, taken 
the lead in this too. For example, Grimwade states that ‘the main users of anti-dumping 
were the developed countries’, particularly the United States (‘US’), the European 
Communities (‘EC’), Canada and Australia.269 
 
Among these giants of international trade, developing countries began to push through 
the current in order to make their mark on the international playing field.270 Research 
suggest that countries such as South Africa becoming one of the biggest users of anti-
dumping policies during the midst of the 1980s, in addition to countries such as 
Argentina, India and Mexico.271 In light of this, it is submitted that South Africa’s actions 
elicits varying questions as to whether its use of anti-dumping is indeed a justifiable 
act or whether its use is that of a protectionist measure in response to the heavy 
handedness of developed countries.  
 
In response to the above, this chapter will thus seek to provide an overview of relevant 
SA legislation that govern antidumping. It will thereafter provide a discussion on how 
South Africa arrived at the legislation dealing with antidumping with reference to 
landmark cases that were heard in respect of antidumping in South African courts. 
Lastly, the chapter will discuss whether free trade has impacted the dumping situation 
																																																						
269 Grimwade at p 7. 
270 https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/protectionism-is-on-the-rise-antidumping-import-investigations/ 
(Accessed 12 August 2017). ‘Comparing 2008 to 2007, the number of new anti-dumping 
investigations opened in 2008 was up 31%, while the number of anti-dumping measures actually 
applied increased by 19%. Developing countries dominated this trend on both sides; they initiated 
73% of all new investigations and were the target of 78% of them.’ 
271 Grimwade at p 7.  
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in South Africa and identify the protectionist measures which South Africa employs 
against antidumping.  
4.2 BACKGROUND TO SOUTH AFRICA’S POSITION ON DUMPING  
South Africa’s use of antidumping regimes began during the time it was subject to 
colonial reign in 1914.272 The Customs Tariff Act of 1914273 imposed a ‘discretionary 
power’ on the Governor-General at the time to levy a duty on goods imported into 
South Africa (when it was classified as the Union of South Africa) that were less than 
the normal price of the goods sold in the exporting country.274 In effect, it prevented 
the Governor-General from abusing the process by obliging the former to provide a 
six-week notice prior to imposing the duty.275 The Board of Trade and Industry was 
the sole authority that was responsible for anti-dumping investigations. However, in 
practice, Customs ‘conducted the dumping part of investigations, while the Board of 
Trade and Industry was responsible for investigating injury and causality as well as 
making the necessary recommendations regarding the impositions of any duties’.276 
The Board was then an independent body that derived its powers from statute277 to 
maintain and develop South African industries ‘including the responsibility of tariff 
increases and decreases, as well as for trade remedies’.278 
 
By 1921, South Africa had imposed its first anti-dumping duty and ‘was a prolific user 
of the instrument right from the start’.279 The country had earned the title of the ‘single 
biggest user during the first ten years of the GATT and again a major user during the 
first fifteen years of the WTO’.280 Brink argues that ‘during the 1970s and the 1980s,	
South Africa was a closed economy with high tariffs to protect local industries’.281 As 
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a result, the domestic industries were unable to compete with foreign imports due to 
their ‘relatively small capacities’.282 
 
During the 1990s, South Africa began to make its way back into the international 
community, after it was faced with sanctions as a result of apartheid.283 The country 
had encouraged the economy to become more competitive and supported the idea of 
integrating its economy with the international community.284 Thereafter, South Africa 
became involved in the multilateral trade negotiations285 discussed at length in chapter 
2.286 
 
Since the establishment of the WTO in 1995, and South Africa’s subsequent 
membership of the WTO, the country stance has changed rapidly, in that it has 
changed from inviting competition into its borders to actually attempting to shun the 
practice entirely.287 This is evident in the fact that South Africa has become one of the 
most prolific users of antidumping since 1995.288 Between 1995 and 2014, South 
Africa has initiated a total of 229 anti-dumping investigations and 137 anti-dumping 
duties.289 This has led to South Africa being ‘the fifth-largest users of anti-dumping 
actions after the US, EU, Argentina and India’.290 See Annexure ‘I’ for South Africa’s 
statistics of the imposition of anti-dumping duties since 1995.  
4.2.1 Case Law Reflecting South Africa’s Position  
According to Ndlovu, there are pertinent cases at the WTO level in which South Africa 
has been a respondent, but has surprisingly never made it past the ‘request for 
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consultation’ levels of the dispute settlement system due to South Africa avoiding 
adverse consequences as a result of ‘diplomatic overtures’.291 
 
In South Africa Anti-Dumping Duties on Certain Pharmaceutical Products from 
India,292 India requested consultations with South Africa in respect of the imposition 
of anti-dumping duties recommended by the Board of Tariffs and Trade on certain 
pharmaceuticals from India.293 The Board contended that the pharmaceuticals were 
being dumped into the SACU and subsequently imposed preliminary and definitive 
anti-dumping duties respectively.294 India contended that the anti-dumping duties were 
in violation of articles 2, 3, 6, 12 and 15 of the ADA.295 
 
Furthermore, in South Africa Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Blanketing 
from Turkey,296 Turkey requested consultations with South Africa in respect of the 
imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties recommended by the Board of Tariffs and 
Trade on imports of blankets in roll form.297 The measures were ‘imposed further into 
an investigation by the Board in respect of the alleged circumvention of anti-dumping 
duties on blankets originating in or imported from Turkey’.298 Turkey claimed that: 
1. The Board had failed to ensure the proper notifications;  
2. The establishment of the facts was improper; 
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3. The Board’s evaluation of these facts ‘was not unbiased and objective, in 
particular, the initiation and conduct of the investigation and the imposition of 
the anti-dumping duty’.299 
 
Lastly, Ndlovu295 notes the case of South Africa Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Uncoated Woodfree Paper,300 in which Indonesia requested consultations with South 
Africa on its ‘continued imposition of anti-dumping measures on imports of uncoated 
wood-free white A4 paper from Indonesia’.301 Albeit the termination of the anti-
dumping measures was brought about, and South Africa noted that the termination 
would not lead to further dumping activities, South Africa continued to impose the 
duties on the Indonesian industry.302 Indonesia claimed that South Africa was in 
violation of articles 11.3, 11.4 and 16.4 of the ADA.303 However, in November 2008, 
the Indonesian authorities were informed that South Africa had effected an 
amendment to the Customs and Excise Act, withdrawing the duties with retrospective 
effect from November 2003, which subsequently led to Indonesia withdrawing its 
request for consultations.304 
This chapter submits that the approach used by South Africa to avoid disputes from 
reaching the Dispute Settlement Body (‘DSB’) at the WTO is, perhaps, a deferral tactic 
in which the country can evade its free trade obligations in order to sustain its 
protectionist stance.305 It is moreover submitted that South Africa’s evasiveness 
towards the DSB is a further indication that the country uses the ADA in a manner that 
shields its domestic industries from foreign suppliers. However, a discussion on the 
country’s relevant legislation could determine the extent of its actions.  
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4.3 LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK AND THE PERTINENT BODIES 
REGULATING ANTI-DUMPING IN SOUTH AFRICA  
Interestingly, in the years between 1924 and 1986, the South African anti-dumping 
legislative framework saw a myriad of changes and amendments in order to bring its 
laws in line with the obligations of the GATT as well as Article VI of GATT.306 In 1992, 
South Africa sought to amend its antidumping legislation, which then became the 
Board on Tariffs and Trade Act 107 of 1986 (‘the Act’).307 The aim of the amendment 
was towards advancing ‘clearer definitions of dumping and a more refined procedural 
application’.308 A further change that came with the Act was the extension of the 
‘jurisdictional and protective reach of the statute by expanding its application to include 
goods imported to the Republic or the South African Customs Union’.309 
 
The Board of Trade and Industry subsequently became the Board on Tariffs and Trade 
(‘the Board’) and was then given full authority to conduct investigations into dumping 
in accordance with the Act.310 The Act was ultimately revised in 1995 in order to bring 
the provisions of the Act in line with the Anti-Dumping Agreement of 1994,311 ‘including 
the definition of normal value’.312  
 
Further, in 2003, the Board on Tariffs and Trade was replaced by the International 
Trade and Administration Commission (‘ITAC’), which presently stands as the main 
authority for anti-dumping investigations in South Africa.313 The establishment of this 
body was founded to ‘rationalize, streamline and modernize an organization with a 
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history that dates back to the 1920s’.314 ITAC forms part of a Schedule 3A Public Entity 
that was founded in terms of the International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002 
(‘ITAA’) that employs ‘strategic international trade instruments in its alignment to 
prevailing trade and industrial policy imperatives’ in its attempt to successfully execute 
its given mandate.315 
 
Complimenting ITAC, was the promulgation of the Anti-Dumping Regulations (‘ADR’) 
that were created under section 59 of the ITAA as an indication ‘to give effect to the 
provisions of the treaties binding on the Republic in international law’.316 The present 
legislative framework now stands with ITAA and its subordinate, the Anti-Dumping 
Regulations, and the Customs and Excise Act,317 as well as various South African 
statutes such as the Promotion of Access to Information Act,318 which ensures access 
to non-confidential information , and also the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act,319 which guarantees a fair administrative process as well as transparency of 
proceedings.320 
 
Most importantly, it is trite that the aforementioned statutes, as well as any law in the 
land, are subject to the rights and obligations set forth by the Constitution of South 
Africa.321 Brink322 submits that the rights associated with anti-dumping investigations 
can be found in the Constitution in sections 32, 33, 33(2) and 195.323 These sections 
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affirm the rights of access to ‘any information held by the state‘; the right to ‘reasonable 
and procedurally fair’ administrative action; the right to require written reasons to be 
given in cases where a person’s rights are adversely affected by an administrative 
action; and the right to require the public administration to provide services ‘impartially, 
fairly, equitably and without bias, and impose the obligation on courts to interpret 
																																																						
(2) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, and may provide for reasonable 
measures to alleviate the administrative and financial burden on the state.’ 
Section 33 of the Constitution reads as follows: 
‘(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. 
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given written reasons.  
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must—  
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(c) promote an efficient administration. ‘ 
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(a) A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained.  
(b) Efficient, economic and effective use of resources must be promoted.  
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‘(6) The nature and functions of different sectors, administrations or institutions of public 
administration are relevant factors to be taken into account in legislation regulating public 
administration.’ 
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decisions in line with international law.324 Notwithstanding South Africa’s membership 
to the GATT and its successor, the WTO since its inception in 1995, it has yet to 
promulgate the ADA into its municipal law.325 This chapter submits that this approach 
is somewhat problematic as, although South Africa is bound to the ADA by virtue of 
being a member of the WTO, it leaves room for South Africa to digress from some of 
the provisions, as the country has promulgated the ADR, which has been found to 
show non-compliance in some of its provisions.326 
 
Whatever the position may be, the South African Constitution nevertheless prescribes 
that ‘the courts, when interpreting any legislation, must prefer the interpretation that is 
consistent with international law to the interpretation that is inconsistent’.327 A 
landmark unreported case that exists with relevance to this is the case of Chairman, 
Board on Tariffs and Trade v Brenco Inc and Others,328 which surrounded the 
‘importance of the Constitution in interpreting international trade laws’.329 The SCA in 
this matter was faced with ‘questions of procedural fairness in the unique context of 
the investigation of dumping and the imposition of anti-dumping duties pursuant to the 
relevant provisions of the Board of Tariffs and Trade Act as well as the Customs and 
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Excise Act’.330 The court naturally leaned into interpreting the national anti-dumping 
law and the corresponding practice in South Africa.331 
 
In arriving at its decision, the court found that the ‘obligations set forth by the [ADA] 
offer some assistance in adjudging the fairness of the investigating authorities in the 
manner of anti-dumping investigations’.332 The SCA further held that the Board on 
Tariffs and Trade ‘had been guided by the Anti-Dumping Agreement in drafting the 
dumping legislation’.333 The court further gave effect to section 233 of the Constitution 
of South Africa stating that ‘[i]n any event, we are required by the Constitution to 
interpret domestic legislation governing the duration of anti-dumping duties 
consistently with these international obligations’.334 
 
A second case that afforded clarity in this contentious matter was the case of RSA v 
SARS,335 which alluded to the relationship of South Africa to the ADA. The SCA held 
that ‘an international agreement would only become law in the Republic of South Africa 
when it is enacted by the national legislation. However, the passing of the ITAA and 
the ADR indicate that the intention of the South African Parliament is to give effect to 
the provision of the [ADA],336 provided that the latter is in conformity with section 233 
of the South Africa Constitution’.337 
 
This chapter appreciates the court’s comments stating that the ADR was guided by 
the ADA, but notes the fact that although it acted as a framework, the door is left open 
for South Africa to interpret the ADR primarily, with the view that they are a generic 
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form of the principles embodied in the ADA, while it has been argued that the ADR 
shows WTO inconsistencies.338 
4.4 FREE TRADE OR PROTECTIONISM: WHAT IS SOUTH AFRICA’S 
STANCE?  
Previously mentioned in this chapter was the fact that South Africa was one of the first 
users of the anti-dumping instrument and subsequently became a ‘prolific user’ in 
ensuing years during the GATT era and, at present, the WTO era. This chapter puts 
forth a submission that it remains to be asked, however, whether South Africa has 
continued this abundant usage as a response to combat international competition 
against its domestic producers. While it remains known that free trade is an integral 
principle of the WTO,339 it is submitted that South Africa seems to tailor the ADA in a 
manner that suits its own needs, that is, to prevent international competition.340 
Beltran-Gomez submits that South Africa finds itself in a ‘permanent dilemma’ of 
opening its economy to free trade when domestic producers have inherent barriers 
that are averse to this worldwide principle.341 The case of International Trade 
Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa342 demonstrated South Africa’s 
position with regard to its usage of anti-dumping duties, in which such position stands 
to be up for debate. 
 
During 2002, an anti-dumping duty was imposed by South Africa on imports of 
stranded wire, rope and cables of iron steel that originated in or were imported by 
various countries, which included the United Kingdom.343 
 
It was alleged by SCAW (which is the largest South African manufacturer of steel 
products)344 that Bridon International Ltd (a British manufacturer of the same products 
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which was, in fact, a  direct competitor of SCAW (referred to hereafter as ‘Bridon UK’) 
was dumping the aforementioned goods in South Africa.345 The matter of contention 
was that the anti-dumping duty was imposed on a number of goods, notwithstanding 
the fact that fishing rope was the only product that was found to be dumped in the 
country.346 Of interest, the anti-dumping duty amounted to 42.1% on the products in 
question, which considerably shielded SCAW as well as other domestic manufacturers 
within the Southern African Customs Union (‘SACU’) from any international 
competiton.347 Approximately five years later, SCAW initiated a sunset review before 
the existing anti-dumping duty expired, with the intention of persuading ITAC ‘to extend 
the life of the existing anti-dumping duties’.348 ITAC accepted the proposal put forth by 
SCAW and conducted a sunset review, investigating whether the removal of the anti-
dumping duties would lead to a continuation of ‘injurious dumping’.349 The subsequent 
report of the investigation by ITAC concluded that dumping would indeed occur once 
the duties were lifted, but dumping of the products in question would not be a product 
of Bridon UK.350 
 
ITAC subsequently recommended a lifting of the duties against Bridon UK, in which 
SCAW responded with an administrative action against ITAC, in which the former 
sought to interdict the latter from removing the anti-dumping duties.351 The matter had 
reached the Constitutional Court, in which the court finally set aside the interdict of the 
High Court after revising the entire case, but, however, ‘failed to properly address the 
competition matter that emerges evidently from the facts’.352 
 
It is clear from the aforementioned case that South Africa primarily imposed the anti-
dumping duty in order to eradicate its direct competition. The idea of creating a 
monopoly remained the foremost goal of SCAW in a manner that undoubtedly sees 
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the manufacturer using the ADA in order to further its own needs. Beltran Gomez 
provides that South Africa is an enthusiastic enforcer of competition laws that not only 
are administered locally, but includes international producers, and furthermore agrees 
to the ‘international commitments of free trade’ 353 thus, creating a monopoly as in the 
SCAW case, is contrary to its own laws.  
 
To the contrary, Bi puts forth a submission that an exploration into the justification of 
dumping is necessary as there has been a proliferation of the use of anti-dumping 
duties by developing countries, including South Africa.354 The author states that the 
general international community are subject to the propagated idea that ‘dumping is 
harmful’, but decline to delve deeper into why it actually occurs.355 Denton further 
provides that antidumping law should not ‘attempt to cleanse the international system 
of distortions’ but should merely aim to reduce ‘the protectionist pressure by reducing 
the unfairness of foreign commercial structures’.356 The law should purely act as a 
‘buffer’ that enhances the ‘effects of structural differences’.357 Thus, this chapter 
submits that the proliferation of protectionism by developing countries such as South 
Africa would resort to trade restrictive barriers only where it is necessary and not as a 
deliberate tactic against larger nations.  
4.4.1 Anti-Dumping of Poultry: South Africa vs United States  
Linked to the above discussion, the trade in chicken between South Africa and the 
United States endured a 15-year debacle, but ultimately reached an agreement in 
June 2015.358 It began in November 1999, when the Board on Tariffs and Trade 
initiated an antidumping investigation into the alleged dumping of poultry products 
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imported into South Africa by the United States.359 The petition was brought by 
Rainbow Farms (Pty) Ltd (‘Rainbow Farms’) ‘on behalf of the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU)’360 and was, in addition, given the support of the South African 
Poultry Association.361 It was alleged by Rainbow Farms that the imports of poultry 
from the US were dumped at prices less than the normal value in the SACU.362 Once 
the anti-dumping investigation was initiated, relevant questionnaires were sent for 
completion to producers and exporters of poultry products in the US.363 
 
In a preliminary investigation, the Board had found material injury to have occurred by 
the dumping of the poultry products into the SACU,364 and later confirmed this finding 
in a final determination, subsequent to receiving comments and submissions from all 
the relevant and interested parties concerned.365 The conclusions reached in the final 
determination included the fact that dumping had ensued on the part of US exporters 
and producers, which inevitably caused material injury to the Southern African 
domestic industries concerned.366 As a result, the Board had recommended the 
imposition of anti-dumping duties on the relevant poultry imports, in order to neutralise 
the loss suffered by the affected domestic industries.367  
 
Relevant to the discussion is that consumers in the South African market tend to lend 
a preference towards dark meat (thighs and legs), whereas American consumers 
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seem to favour white meat (breasts and wings).368 As a result of this fact, the US 
market were able to sell portions of dark meat in the South African market for a higher 
price than the amount for which it was sold for in its home market.369 Watson states 
that this per se does not constitute dumping, for the reason that the export price was 
higher than the home market price.370 A study of the case found that notwithstanding 
the detail that ‘the average value of US chicken producers’ exports to South Africa 
minus transportation costs exceeded the US market price consistently throughout the 
period of investigation’ used by the Board,371 anti-dumping duties were nonetheless 
imposed on US poultry ranging from 209 to 375%.372 
 
This exorbitant range of the percentage of anti-dumping duties, was a bold yet 
incredibly protectionist move on the part of South Africa, which effectively locked the 
US out of the South African market completely.373 The rationale of the prohibitive 
duties was based on the premise that South Africa centred its investigation on 
‘constructive value’374 and disregarded the home market value of the US.375 
 
This chapter submits that the general premise of article 2.2 of the ADA is that 
constructive value may be used in anti-dumping investigations only where ‘there are 
no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade within the domestic market 
																																																						
368 Report No. 195 Sunset review of the anti-dumping duties on frozen meat of fowls of the species 
Gallus domesticus cut in pieces with bone-in originating in or imported from the United States of 
America at para 4.1.1. See also R Henry & G Rothwell ‘The World Poultry Industry’ (1995) 
International Finance Corporation p 12. 
369 Watson KW ‘Antidumping Fowls Out: US – South Africa Chicken Dispute Highlights the Need for 
Global Reform’ Free Trade Bulletin No. 62 https://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-
bulletin/antidumping-fowls-out-us-south-africa-chicken-dispute-highlights (Accessed 29 August 2017).  
370 Watson KW ‘Antidumping Fowls Out: US – South Africa Chicken Dispute Highlights the Need for 
Global Reform’ Free Trade Bulletin No. 62 https://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-
bulletin/antidumping-fowls-out-us-south-africa-chicken-dispute-highlights (Accessed 29 August 2017).  
371 Coleman JR, Fry J, and Payne WS, ‘Use of Antidumping Measures by Developing Countries: The 
Impact on U.S. Exports of Agricultural Products’ (paper presented at ‘Agricultural Policy Reform and 
the WTO: Where Are We Heading?’ Capri, Italy, June 23–26, 2003). 
372 Board on Tariffs and Trade Report No. 4088(2000) ‘Investigation into the alleged dumping of meat 
of fowls of the species Gallus domesticus, originating in or imported from the United States of 
America: Final Determination’ at p. 96. 
373 Watson KW ‘Antidumping Fowls Out: US – South Africa Chicken Dispute Highlights the Need for 
Global Reform’ Free Trade Bulletin No. 62 https://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-
bulletin/antidumping-fowls-out-us-south-africa-chicken-dispute-highlights (Accessed 29 August 2017).  
374 Article 2.2 of ADA. See also Chapter 2 for a discussion on this provision.  
375 Watson KW ‘Antidumping Fowls Out: US – South Africa Chicken Dispute Highlights the Need for 
Global Reform’ Free Trade Bulletin No. 62 https://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-
bulletin/antidumping-fowls-out-us-south-africa-chicken-dispute-highlights (Accessed 29 August 2017). 
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of the exporting country’ or ‘because a particular market situation exists or the volume 
of imports [is] so low, the price of the products [is] unable to be compared to a like a 
product when exported to a third country’.  
 
As such, to comply with the ordinary course of trade requirement, Rainbow Farms 
alleged that ‘sales prices in the USA show an anomaly that cannot be applied 
universally’,376 and disregarded the USA’s allocation of costs ‘as it did not reasonably 
reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of brown chicken meat’.377 A 
further compliance measure taken by South Africa in order to use the constructive 
value method was the allegation that the Board made in respect of a particular market 
situation being present.378 It came to this conclusion by relying on the preference of 
the respective countries to dark and white poultry meat.379 The Board alleged that the 
strong preference for white meat by the US caused the prices of brown meat to be 
significantly low, which is ‘prevalent in a number of countries such as Canada and the 
European Union’.380 
 
The calculation methods and subsequent imposition of anti-dumping duties prompted 
the US poultry industry to pursue bilateral negotiations with South Africa on the basis 
that the methods and duties violated the rules of the WTO.381 The debate centred 
around the renewal of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (‘AGOA’) in 2015 by 
the US Congress.382 The proposal put forth by the USA was to exclude South Africa 
from the ‘AGOA trade preferences unless greater market access was granted’.383 
																																																						
376 Board on Tariffs and Trade Report No. 4088(2000) ‘Investigation into the alleged dumping of meat 
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377 Ibid at p. 23. 
378 Fillis at p 30.  
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America: Final Determination’ at p. 18. 
380 Ibid at p. 19. 
381 Cochrane N, Hansen J and Seeley R ‘Poultry Production and Trade in the Republic of South 
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South Africa’s robust interest in AGOA and its benefits resulted in the agreement of a 
quota ‘to allow 65 000 tons of ‘bone-in’ chicken into the South African market’.384 
 
It is the view of the research that South Africa, in light of the above, appears to embody 
an approach that is incredibly threatened in respect of international competition. That 
being said, South Africa has reason to personalise such a stance due to the potential 
and actual threat that dumping has on the domestic industries, with the effect of 
eradicating major industries.385 However, in the poultry debacle between South Africa 
and the USA, the US authorities claimed that South Africa’s actions amounted to 
‘poorly disguised protectionism’.386 
 
In the interests of fairness, South Africa as well as other developing countries which 
face possible injury to domestic industries by countries such as the US should strive 
to conduct their investigations on an objective basis, while simultaneously taking into 
account all relevant circumstances of the case in order to arrive at a conclusion that is 
just and fair to the affected party. Allowing market access to international giants 
creates reciprocal and advantageous trade preferences (such as AGOA and the 
SADC-EPA with the EU387), as opposed to shutting foreign exporters out completely. 
Developing countries such as South Africa should, however, continue to condemn 
dumping and other unfair trading practices, while ensuring fair compliance to the ADA 
and other WTO obligations.  
  
																																																						
384 ‘South Africa and AGOA: What is at Stake?’ taken from http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-
analysis/south-africa-and-agoa-what-is-at-stake (Accessed 29 August 2017).  
385 http://www.destinyconnect.com/2017/01/11/rainbow-chicken-close-farms/ (Accessed 29 August 
2017). 
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4.4.2 Poultry Industry in Crisis: South Africa vs the European Union 
South Africa found itself in yet another debacle involving dumped poultry products 
from the EU.388 As a result of the alleged dumping by the EU, an outpour of job losses 
has occurred, in addition to one of South Africa’s biggest poultry producers, RCL 
Foods,389 closing 15 of its 25 poultry farms.390 SAPA has openly condemned the EU 
for dumping poultry into the Republic, with workers of the Food and Allied Workers 
Union (‘FAWU’) embarking on a march to the EU headquarters situated in Pretoria in 
February 2017 over the immense number of job losses as a result of alleged 
dumping.391 
 
In response, the EU has labelled South Africa’s allegations against the Union as a 
‘handy scapegoat’ and claimed that ‘a lack of competition, a severe drought pushing 
up feed prices, rising electricity costs and injecting brine (salt water) were causing 
South African industry's problems rather than EU imports’.392 South Africa has, 
however, criticised the EU for its ‘rampant dumping’ and disregarded the claim of lack 
of ‘competitiveness’.393 
 
Given the fact that South Africa has in place the SADC-EPA with the EU (which is a 
free trade agreement), the agreement allows for the imposition of safeguard measures 
for domestic industries ‘if imports create significant disruptions and instabilities, job 
losses included’.394 South Africa subsequently introduced a 13.9% safeguard duty in 
order to combat the effect of dumping by the EU in the Republic,395 which the South 
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African Poultry Association (SAPA) has denounced as being ‘grossly inadequate’.396 
This provisional measure expired in July 2017;397 however, as of March 2017, ITAC 
was conducting an investigation into whether this measure should be increased.398 In 
addition to the ‘rampant dumping by the EU’, South Africa was furthermore forced to 
place a ban on European exporters of poultry, following the outbreak of avian influenza 
in Europe.399 
 
It is interesting to note that South Africa has been rather prolonged in its response to 
the act of dumping by the EU. It is submitted that the effects of dumping by the EU 
have been more far reaching than those of dumping by the US, yet a more robust 
approach was taken during the latter case. It is the view of this research that South 
Africa should tackle dumping cases factually, and where the effects seem to be far 
reaching, such as the present one, strong and forceful measures should be taken in 
order to safeguard its domestic industries. This chapter submits that South Africa 
employed the necessary, albeit not correct, approaches to the wrong cases (such as 
dumping from the US), and should have focused its forceful method on the present 
EU poultry devastation.  
4.4.3 How has Dumping Affected South Africa in respect of Free Trade?  
South Africa employs various types of trade restrictive barriers in respect of dumping, 
namely that being tariffs, import quotas and non-tariff barriers.400 Sihlobo notes that in 
2016 ‘the tariff on wheat imported in South Africa increased by 30% to an all-time high 
of R1 591.40 per ton of wheat’.401 
 
																																																						
396 Ibid. 
397 Ibid. 
398 Ensor L ‘Clucking in a Chicken Coop’ The Times Newspaper 24 March 2017, p 8.  
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In terms of import quotas, Biacuana states that China’s share in ‘South Africa’s total 
imports of clothing and textiles rocketed from 16.1% in 1996 to 60.7% in 2008’.402 
Estimates recorded that from the period of 2002 to 2008, 69 000 jobs were lost in 
South Africa’s clothing and textile industry.403 Referring to non-tariff barriers, Radlickli 
states that in the example of trade between the EU and South Africa, African products 
need to comply with the so called ‘Hurdles-To-Pass’ (‘HTPs’).404 
 
This chapter submits that South Africa seems to have been wounded by the overly 
injurious effect that the practice of dumping has left on its domestic industries. Thus, 
its increased usage has become what Nakagawa has termed, a ‘tit-for-tat’ measure.405 
It is submitted that South Africa shows its intimidated nature when foreign imports are 
concerned, and therefore loses sight of its free trade obligations. In light of the poultry 
debacle with the EU, the discretion that the government holds in employing trade 
restrictive barriers against injurious dumping means that the ‘cards are stacked in 
favour of foreign producers who dump their products in SA and this even applies to 
predatory dumpers’.406 Thus, the South African government should become proactive 
in such cases as it leads to disastrous circumstances, such as industry collapse.407 
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4.5 CONCLUSION 
In light of the analysis of legislation and case law in particular discussed in this chapter, 
it has been found that South Africa’s approach to international trade is no doubt 
protectionist, but sometimes necessary. It is difficult for countries to welcome 
international competition, especially developing and least developed countries, that 
are faced with instances of dumping that causes extreme material injury to its domestic 
industries, such as the EU poultry case mentioned above. Although free trade remains 
the primary goal, various ways exist in which extreme protectionist measures need not 
be resorted to. In the following and final chapter of this research, recommendations 
and conclusions will be offered to contribute to the worldwide debate around free trade 
and protectionism.  
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CHAPTER 5:  
FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS  
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
As the title of this thesis observes, there exists a conflict between two ideals, namely 
that of free trade, encouraged widely by the WTO on the one hand, and protectionism, 
not entirely outlawed by the WTO, but sometimes necessary. As such, in particular, 
the ADA has seen itself as being one of the catalysts used in the proliferation of 
protectionism globally, as states from all parts of the world tailor this Agreement in a 
manner that locks out international competition, a further ideal projected by the 
WTO.408 It is submitted that the role of free trade and the advantages that are brought 
with it have become somewhat lost as states such as South Africa have become 
selective with regard to where to practise free trade and where to abandon it 
entirely.409 
 
While this thesis engaged in the debate concerning this conflict, the focus centred 
much more on the position that free trade and protectionism occupy in the global 
trading sphere. In doing so, the research paid attention to the effect that the formation 
of the GATT and, at present, the establishment of the WTO, has on these conflicting 
ideals. This research furthermore analysed specific provisions of the ADA and the 
effect it has on current dumping practices in countries relevant to the study. In 
particular, as the title suggests, this research aimed at discussing South Africa’s role 
in the international trading field in respect of dumping practices. In doing so, the 
objective was to discuss the domestic antidumping legislation that exists in South 
Africa as well as discuss/critique the manner in which South Africa arrived at said 
legislation.  
 
Finally, the thesis explored the implications of the encouragement of free trade against 
the backdrop of South African dumping practices, in addition to uncovering specific 
protectionist tools used by South Africa.  
																																																						
408 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (Accessed 4 October 2017). 
409 See the SCAW case, discussed in chapter 4. See also the SADC-EPA discussed briefly in Chapter 
4 at p 61.  
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5.2 FINDINGS IN RESPECT OF THE CHAPTERS 
A previous discussion contained in Chapter 2 documented the gradual establishment 
of the institutions that governed international trade, namely that of the GATT as well 
as the WTO. The chapter sought to determine and note the effects that the 
establishment of the WTO has had on dumping. Particularly, the research found that 
the ADA shows a deficiency in fairness410 and that it should be interpreted in a manner 
that is more restrictive.411 In terms of the former argument, the research sought to 
critique the ADA with regard to its lack of fairness, in that the use of antidumping has 
not been in line with one of the main reasons for the practice.412 In particular, it was 
established that the test for antidumping involves the enquiry as to whether the act of 
dumping causes injury to the domestic industry. Lekfuangfu, interestingly, submits that 
injury to the domestic industry is not equivalent to market distortion.413 
 
Having identified these impediments and positive elements of the said Agreement, the 
research correlated the role that free trade and protectionist principles play in the 
multilateral trading system and found that there is indeed a discord between them in 
respect of the ADA, in that countries find themselves in conflict involving protecting 
their own industries and complying with their free trade obligations in terms of their 
commitment to multilateral trade.  
 
Evidence of such conflict emerged in chapter 3, which documented at length specific 
provisions contained in the ADA, and further enquired as to how the establishment of 
the ADA has affected dumping practices since its inception. It was found from the 
provisions analysed that there had been some ambiguities attached which were then 
somewhat clarified in the case law discussed.414 Notably, the effect that the 
establishment of the ADA on dumping has in the opinion of this research allowed 
countries to take advantage of these lacunae contained in the ADA, as a protectionist 
																																																						
410 Lekfuangfu at p 306. 
411 Adamantopoulos et al, at p 33. 
412 Ibid at p 33. ‘One of the main reasons put forward against the practice of dumping is that it causes 
distortion to the market and hampers the market's ability to provide protection for fair competition and 
international competitive process’.  
413 Ibid. Due to the economic rationales behind this theory, this thesis will not engage in a substantive 
discussion on this matter.  
414 Chapter 3, pp 37 – 43.  
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tool. Furthermore, the research found that although the ADA is a tool designed to come 
to the aid of the affected country, it should also not be biased towards the responding 
Member, as the ADA affords each party an equal opportunity to make representations 
for their actions.  
 
To illustrate the practical implementation of the ADA, chapter 4 then engaged in the 
discussion of whether South Africa, as an increasing user of antidumping measures, 
has indeed distorted the use of the ADA in a protectionist manner. The country’s 
involvement in antidumping practices and policies prompted the chapter to enquire 
further as to how South Africa had arrived at its antidumping legislation as well as the 
effects that free trade has had on the country in respect of dumping practices. Lastly, 
the research explored the protectionist measures that South Africa employs against 
dumping practices and found that South Africa has become one of the biggest users 
of the antidumping practice, along with other developing countries such as China and 
Mexico post-1980, as a response to developed countries using their own trade-
restrictive barriers against South Africa and other developing countries mentioned.  
 
The findings also included South Africa’s mixed reactions against dumping from 
different countries in that the country employs a robust approach to poultry dumping 
from the US, effectively locking the US out from the South African market almost 
entirely. However, South Africa seems to embody a lax attitude to poultry dumping 
from the EU that has almost eradicated the South African poultry industry entirely. In 
addition, from the SCAW case,415 it was found that South Africa clearly employs 
antidumping measures in an attempt to lock out international competition, which is, by 
its very nature, protectionism.  
 
Interestingly, chapter 4416 noted that free trade has not in actuality played any part in 
South Africa in respect of dumping in the country. Although the country is ‘scarred’ by 
the injury left by dumping of other countries on its domestic industries, and from its ‘tit-
for-tat’ attitude against developed countries employing their own restrictive barriers, it 
seems that South Africa has no issue in conducting trade within its regional borders. 
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416 chapter 4, p 70.  
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The fact that the poultry dispute between South Africa and the US over poultry 
dumping lasted for approximately 15 years shows the ‘closed off’ and incredibly 
protectionist attitude of South Africa. As such, the research found that South Africa’s 
main trade restrictive tools include tariffs and non-tariff barriers as well as import 
quotas, and, in addition, provided examples of South Africa’s use of the above 
protectionist tools.  
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The study identified the misuse of antidumping measures and aims to proffer the views 
and recommendations of particular authors. In this respect, Bi has critiqued the ADA, 
stating that the ‘misuse of antidumping is mainly due to its arbitrary and biased rules 
and procedures’, with many authors debating its very justification.417 Bi has 
recommended, arguably, that antidumping laws be reconciled with competition laws 
in that their harmonisation can contribute to economic development.418 The author 
furthermore submits that competition policies are more meticulous and show a lower 
probability of being used in a protectionist manner, but furthermore recognises that 
antidumping laws cannot be abolished completely in the near future.419 As such, Bi 
suggests that a gradual inception into competition policy be achieved, firstly at bilateral 
or regional levels, and finally, at the WTO level.420 
 
Further, Adamantopoulos and De Notaris submit that because the ADA is contrary to 
the ideals envisioned by the WTO, the ADA should be interpreted in a manner that is 
restrictive.421 The aforementioned authors also suggest that competition policy be 
taken to ‘the heart of the injury analysis’ in that antidumping duties should be 
implemented only where the relevant competition authorities declare that there is no 
evidence of anti-competitive behaviour, and therefore do not have ‘any bearing on the 
																																																						
417 Bi at pp 30–31.  
418 Bi at p 50. ‘Although due to other political factors, the subject of trade and competition was decided 
to be put aside within the WTO during Doha Round in 2004, the economic crisis in 2009 has once 
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injury analysis’.422 As such, the authors highlight that this would then solidify the use 
of antidumping duties for their ‘original purpose, namely to protect domestic industries 
from harmful unfair foreign-based competition’.423 
  
Echoing the sentiments of Adamantopoulos et al, this thesis is in agreement that the 
ADA should be construed in a manner that is restrictive, having regard to the idea that 
competition and antidumping laws should be harmonised. While it is trite that the ADA 
restricts the excessive usage of antidumping,424 Adamantopoulos et al submit that 
‘such restrictive rules should be designed to enhance competition, or at least not to 
hinder fair competition, between domestic and imported goods’.425 
 
The premise that antidumping laws can be used in a manner that enhances, for 
example, competition426 sets a new tone in respect of the international trading sphere. 
Thus, using the ADA in a way that defeats competition in a form of protectionism is 
counter to the ideals projected by the WTO. The harmonisation of the competition and 
anti-dumping laws, it is submitted, could give rise to strengthened trading partnerships 
between Members of the WTO. In addition, this research submits that the 
strengthening of trading relationships with developing countries could lower the usage 
of anti-dumping duties being used by such countries as a ‘tit-for-tat measure’,427 and 
rather utilise the ADA for its fundamental purpose,428 while furthering the interest of 
their own economies as a result of partnerships forged with developed countries.  
 
As is evidenced from the research conducted in this thesis, this change is a mammoth 
task to undertake at WTO level. Furthermore, the merging of these principles 
(competition and anti-dumping laws) might lead to perpetual negotiations, resulting in 
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dissensus among the many members of the WTO. Thus, this thesis proposes that 
such a change be implemented at domestic level, at the volition of a country’s own 
authorities and national government, in order to achieve the objectives mentioned 
above.  
 
Further, as a focal element in any international trade issue, it is submitted that 
developing and least developed countries each have a role in key negotiations aimed 
at ensuring smooth trade worldwide. In an effort to involve the aforementioned 
countries in said negotiations, the Doha Round was established to achieve exactly 
thta.429 As noted in this research, since its inception in 2001,430 developing countries 
have submitted proposals in order to correct some of the issues faced in implementing 
various WTO agreements. Kufuor431 has noted that African countries in particular have 
been aware of the abuse of the ADA that has been a ‘disguised means of 
protection’.432 As such, Kufuor puts forth submissions in respect of certain provisions 
of the ADA. In particular, South Africa proposed submissions433 in respect of, first, the 
sunset review provision, and second, the definition of domestic industry provision. 
Such submissions are discussed below.  
 
Respectively, three main arguments have been identified as relevant by South Africa. 
Firstly, South Africa has argued that notwithstanding the provision on sunset reviews, 
WTO members are ‘prolonging the life of anti-dumping measures’.434 Representatives 
have furthermore argued that article 11.3 of the ADA is vague, requiring more 
guidance on how to terminate the reviews.435 Consequently, South Africa’s proposal 
to rectify this lacuna is to limit sunset reviews to a ‘single review’, and should the 
expiration of the antidumping duty be likely to cause a recurrence of dumping, such 
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duty should remain for a period not exceeding three years.436 The South African 
representatives also submit that there should be a restraint on authorities initiating 
sunset reviews on their own accord, as this should be done by the domestic industries 
concerned.437 
 
This thesis agrees with the above proposal put forth by South Africa, as prolonging 
the implementation of an anti-dumping duty is the pinnacle of protectionism. 
Therefore, restricting this practice and curtailing the timeframe of anti-dumping duties 
could remove their arbitrary usage for any time longer than necessary.  
 
The proposals put forth by South Africa in respect of the definition of a domestic 
industry followed the country’s criticism that article 4.1 ‘provides investigating agencies 
[with] a very wide latitude to determine what constitutes ‘a major proportion of domestic 
production’.438 In line with this, South Africa’s recommendation that the article be more 
detailed and be revised to enhance the ‘transparency and predictability of anti-
dumping proceedings’439 is considered viable by this research.  
 
As discussed in previous chapters, South Africa has become one of the most prolific 
users of anti-dumping measures in recent years.440 The country has in fact 
implemented its own Anti-Dumping Regulations (‘ADR’) that follow the wording of the 
ADA, as its primary source of anti-dumping legislation, owing to South Africa not yet 
having implemented the ADA into municipal law.441 Brink argues that the South African 
antidumping system is unpredictable in practice, and it is often the case that the ADR 
are improperly applied, leading to uncertainty in the market, the imposition of duties 
that in actuality should not be imposed, and vice versa.442 
 
																																																						
436 Ibid.  
437 Ibid.  
438 Kufuor at p 175.  
439 Ibid.  
440 See Annexure I’.  
441 Brink (2012) at pp 6–7. 
442 Brink (2012) at p 55.  
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Brink in addition engages in a substantial discussion, proposing that the ADR include 
a provision dealing with national interest.443 The author submits that the rights of the 
domestic industry in question experiencing injury against dumping and the effect that 
the antidumping duty would cause to the industry which uses the products, as well as 
the effect that the imposition of the duty would have on consumers, should be 
balanced, taking cognisance of the fact that national interest as an element in the 
investigation would ‘place a higher premium on job creation or retention in the 
manufacturing industry’.444 
 
Brink445 notes that despite the aforementioned submission, national interest should 
not be included in the South African legislation at present due to many factors.446 
However, he advises that should such a provision be included in the legislation, the 
factors should be included only ‘if it is clearly shown that it would be against national 
interest to impose an antidumping duty’.447 
 
 This chapter submits that in reading the proposals put forth by Brink, it may be in the 
best interests of South Africa to include such a provision involving national interest. 
Furthermore, public interest and national interest can be interpreted as synonymous 
terms; and the best interests of the country, be they economic, political or military,448 
should be an element in anti-dumping investigations, where the imposition of such 
duties can have far-reaching effects. If public interest is a factor most widely used by 
																																																						
443 Brink G ‘National Interest in Anti-Dumping Investigations’ The South African Law Journal (2009).  
444 Ibid at p 358.  
445 Ibid.  
446 These include: ‘1. anti-dumping investigations by their very nature cause significant uncertainty in 
the market;   
2. ITAC struggles to conclude investigations in time, and seldom concludes investigations within the 
12 months within which investigations should be completed;   
3. the inclusion of national interest provisions will further delay the finalisation of investigations, even if 
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447 Brink (2009) at p 359. 
448 Brink (2009) at p 319.  
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South African courts in litigious matters in order to arrive at decisions that are just, fair 
and equitable, it is submitted that national interest should also be included in 
antidumping investigations to achieve similar outcomes. 
 
The anxiety felt by developing countries to dumped imports are evident in their 
increased usage of antidumping duties. Post-1980, developing countries experienced 
a radical shift of ‘being the target to the initiator’.449 Gupta and Choudhury submit that 
in order to eradicate the fears felt by developing countries against international 
competition, ‘special and differential treatment for developing countries’, such as 
particular rules available for initiating an investigation, concessions involving import 
share, and an increased de minimis threshold, could be implemented.450 
 
This thesis furthermore recommends that in terms of infant industry theory, developing 
countries should be able to freely engage in protectionist activities where international 
markets threaten or actually injure infant industries in developing or least developed 
countries that have the potential to diversify that economy.451 Such measures should, 
however, be controlled and should refrain from excessive usage.  
5.4 PARTICULAR CONCERNS  
5.4.1 ‘Threat of material injury’ 
Soprano has argued that the provision involving ‘threat of material injury’452 should 
ultimately be removed from the ADA, for the reason that the ‘possibility of resorting to 
the threat of injury gives to domestic producers the capacity to be protected before the 
damage is done’.453 As a result, this provides domestic producers with the opportunity 
to implement anti-dumping measures on the basis of future events that possibly may 
not occur,454 thus fuelling the protectionism fire. Lowenfeld furthermore submits that 
																																																						
449 See chapter 4 ‘Annexure I’ discussing the increased usage of antidumping duties by South Africa 
post 1980. See also Gupta K, Choudhury V ‘Anti-Dumping and Developing Countries’ Korea 
University Law Review, Vol 10, Issue 117 (2011) p 133.  
450 Ibid at p 134.  
451 https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/glossary/infant-industry-argument/ (Accessed 12 October 
2017).  
452 See chapter 3.  
453 Soprano at p 77.  
454 Ibid. 
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providing relief for threats of injury ‘should not be available as a second resort when 
the effort to prove actual injury has been unsuccessful’, because the threat of injury 
involves conjecture and not conclusive facts.455 
 
It is the view of this thesis that the provisions concerning the ‘threat of material injury’ 
provide a wide discretion to authorities to implement trade-restrictive barriers such as 
anti-dumping measures in necessary circumstances. That being said, authorities need 
not wait for injury actually to have occurred in order for such measures to be 
implemented. This chapter agrees with this provision in that, although the ADA acts in 
a manner that is consistent with WTO aims, it also embodies the option of protection 
by domestic industries, provided that pertinent evidence is furnished.  
5.4.2 Self-Initiated Investigations in South Africa 
An anti-dumping investigation may be initiated only upon acceptance of a written 
application by or on behalf of the domestic industry.456 However, article 5.1 of the ADA 
displays the proviso that self-initiated investigations by authorities on behalf of 
domestic industries may occur only in special circumstances.457 The South African 
ADR. as noted by Ndlovu,458 do not, however, contain any provision involving ‘special 
circumstances’. Ndlovu thus recommends that the ADR reflect the purpose of the 
ADA, and insert such a provision in order to prevent an abuse of self-initiated 
investigations by pertinent authorities.459 The author affirms that retaining this 
provision would ‘ensure that the standard of proof of the existence of dumping remains 
high’ that would deter the authorities from initiating arbitrary and ‘WTO-inconsistent 
self-initiated investigations’.460 Ndlovu further asserts that retaining the self-initiating 
provisions ‘will come in handy’ in the foreseeable future when circumstances demand 
that such provision be utilised.461 
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456 Article 5.1 of ADA. 
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This thesis agrees with the recommendations put forth by Ndlovu, as controlling the 
manner in which self-initiated investigations are implemented can be the start of 
bringing South Africa more in line with its free trade obligations. It is furthermore 
submitted that embarking on the course of making the ADR more WTO compliant 
could set off a gradual chain of events that could deter South Africa from using the 
ADA as a veiled protectionist tool. It can, in addition, be argued that the lacunae 
contained in the ADR enable the South African authorities to engage in protectionist 
actions, without totally being called to action by the WTO, because the ADA has not 
been promulgated into domestic law by Parliament. Thus, it is moreover 
recommended that ensuring compliance of the ADR with WTO obligations could bring 
an end to South Africa’s overzealous protectionist actions.  
 
However, in matters where protectionist tools are used in excess, such actions should 
be disciplined in the appropriate manner. Referring to Chapter 4, the research found 
that South Africa has been incredibly delayed in controlling the dumped imports of 
chicken by the EU that have led to the shut-down of the poultry industry, but embodied 
a robust approach to the US market dumping poultry some years before. This chapter 
recommends that civil societies need to be proactive in scrutinising their actions and 
behaviour when it comes to dumping in general, and should not react in different ways 
to different international markets.  
 
This research has found that South Africa, as well as other developing countries, has 
embodied a protectionist stance where foreign imports are concerned, as a reaction 
first, to developed countries employing their own antidumping duties, thereby 
restricting developing countries market access; and second, to lock out international 
competition entirely. This thesis ultimately recommends that in certain circumstances, 
protectionism is warranted. It should be noted that much like dumping, protectionism 
is condemned and not outlawed. The research thus submits that protectionism can be 
employed where the situation warrants it. Where domestic industries are under threat 
of being eradicated or suffer injurious effects as a result of dumping, a country may 
then embark on trade-restrictive barriers in order to protect the pertinent industries.  
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5.5 CONCLUSION  
In light of the facts presented, the research has unequivocally found that the ADA was 
primarily enacted to provide relief to those countries who were gravely affected by 
dumping and its injurious effects on their respective domestic industries. As a further 
rationale for its enactment, the ADA was also promulgated in order to control the usage 
of antidumping duties that can be imposed in circumstances that call for it, provided 
certain criteria are met. While developed countries became the forerunner in 
implementing antidumping duties in its inception years, it became apparent post 1980 
that developing countries had begun to assert their force and started their own 
antidumping actions, but were then criticised for using the ADA as a protectionist tool, 
South Africa being one of the main users in this regard.  
 
As such, this thesis ultimately finds that free trade is obligatory in order to bring 
together a harmonisation of the multilateral trading system, but protectionism is 
necessary in particular circumstances, thereby achieving a balance between free 
trade and protectionism. The research submits that the exclusion of one would be too 
much of a radical approach which could lead to adverse effects and undermine the 
development capacity of countries such as South Africa. Therefore, this thesis 
recognises that there is a tough balancing act of these two principles in that South 
Africa, as Member to the WTO, has to make sure that it complies with such provisions 
and in terms of the ADA. If South Africa does so, and refrains from taking a robust role 
in respect of protectionism, this thesis ultimately submits that there is room for both 
free trade and protectionism in the multilateral trading sphere, and employing such 
measures where necessary, but adhering to international obligations.  
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ANNEXURE ‘I‘ 
Table 1: Anti-Dumping Initiations and Measures by Year  
 
Year Initiations Duties 
1914–1947 137 N/A 
1948–1958 211 2982 
1959–1978 265 N/A 
1979–1994 270 N/A 
TOTAL PRE-WTO 883 N/A 
1995–1999 130 88 
2000–2004 45 25 
2005–2009 37 15 
2010–2014 17 6 (9*) 
TOTAL UNDER WTO 229 134 (137)  
 
[Source: These data and the table were taken from Brink G ‘One Hundred Years of Anti-
dumping in South Africa’ Journal of World Trade (2015) at page 9.]  
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